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Summary
This thesis provides benchmark estimates of the impact of disability on labour force 
participation in Ireland. Given the current focus on disability policy, this research is 
both necessary and timely for policymakers. In estimating the effect of disability on 
labour force participation, we are faced with many secondary questions and 
methodological problems, many of which this thesis aims to address. To this end, it 
contributes significantly to both national and international literature. The core questions 
addressed are;
• What is the impact of disability on participation?
• How significant are unobserved effects and state dependence?
• Is there differential measurement error in self-reported disability?
• What are the separate impacts of unobserved effects and measurement error in a 
labour force participation model?
Previous research (Bound, 1991 and Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002) has set out the 
main methodological issues involved, namely classical and differential measurement 
error, endogeneity from participation to disability and endogeneity via unobserved 
heterogeneity. This thesis uses novel methods to address all of these issues and 
concludes with a new estimate of the impact of disability on participation. Key results 
include;
• the base effect of disability is to reduce labour force participation by 
approximately 30 percentage points, (participation rates for the non-disabled is 
70 per cent);
• unobserved heterogeneity (comprising mainly of state dependence) accounts for 
50 per cent of this base estimate;
• the disabled/ill labour force group are twice as likely to mis-report a severely 
limiting disability compared to what they would report if assessed as employed;
• the true impact of disability is to reduce participation by about 15 percentage 
points. Compared to the original estimate of 26 percentage points, about half of 
the bias is due to unobservables, and the remaining half is a combination of 
differential and classical measurement error.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
People with disabilities face many barriers to full participation in society, not least in 
the labour market. The extent and nature of participation in the labour market has a 
multitude of direct and indirect effects on the living standards and quality of life of 
people with disabilities, and is thus a critical area for investigation and policy concern. 
Furthermore, low employment rates of people with disabilities are increasingly 
becoming an issue of macroeconomic concern, as these people form an important set of 
currently under-utilised human resources (OECD, 2003). In terms of social expenditure, 
that on disability related programmes is over double that of unemployment 
compensation in many countries. Ireland is no exception - expenditure on illness and 
disability amounted to approximately 14% of total social welfare spending in 2004, over 
1% of GDP. Although most OECD countries have undertaken substantial policy reform 
in terms of legislation, the extent of non-participation increased during the 1990s 
(OECD, 2003). For example, recent equality legislation in Ireland (namely the 
Employment Equality Act 1998 and Equal Status Act 2000) introduced disability as a 
ground on which discrimination in employment could not occur.
However, to date there has been no comprehensive account of the extent of participation 
for people with disabilities in Ireland, (see Bound (1991) for a review of international 
literature). The aim of this thesis therefore is to provide a detailed description of the 
labour market situation of people with disabilities in Ireland, and an analysis of factors 
associated with participation. Firstly, this thesis will provide, for the first time, 
benchmark levels of labour force participation by people with disabilities in Ireland. 
The benchmark levels are of crucial relevance to disability and employment policy in 
Ireland. With recent advances in disability law concerning the move towards a civil 
rights approach to disability, answers to this question are of significant importance to 
disability stakeholders, for example the National Disability Authority and Disability 
Federation Ireland. Secondly, this thesis contributes to international research by 
applying the latest econometric methodologies to analyse the relationship between 
disability and labour force participation. It seeks to answer how much of self-reported 
disability is measurement error arising from mis-reporting, and how much of the impact
1.1 Introduction
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of disability on participation is due to unobserved individual characteristics. 
Furthermore, it estimates a dynamic model to determine the extent of the impact of 
previous non-participation, i.e. state dependence. The econometric models used to 
address these issues have been developed quite recently and these will be discussed in 
detail throughout the thesis. The application of these models to the problem of 
unobserved effects is novel in the disability and participation literature and provides a 
new way of approaching these questions. The model used to address the measurement 
error issue builds on previous econometric models, but the final version also applies a 
new variation of the model. The issues of measurement error and unobserved effects are 
also of interest to policy makers, as their results help to identify channels by which 
disability impacts on participation.
1.2 Review of disability schemes in Ireland
Disability schemes in Ireland are varied depending on whether or not the 
disability/illness is short-term or long-term, the extent of previous social insurance 
contributions and the cause of disability. Figure 1.1 illustrates a brief description. A 
report by the Department of Social and Family Affairs provides a more in-depth 
discussion of these payments and their historical context, (2003). To summarise, 
disability payments may be categorised into short and long-term payments, and 
entitlements also vary by previous social insurance contributions. The amounts received 
are comparable to unemployment assistance/benefit, so in that respect there is no 
incentive to prefer disability benefit. The incentive structure therefore lies in 
accessibility of these payments -  if people think that disability payments are more 
readily available than unemployment payments, this may influence their disability 
reporting behaviour. Two main types of disability payments exist in Ireland -Disability 
Allowance is a weekly allowance paid to people with a disability who are aged 16 or 
over and under age 66. The disability must be expected to last for at least one year and 
the allowance is subject to both a medical suitability and a means test. The Deciding 
Officer may refer an individual for a medical assessment. Disability Benefit is a 
payment made to insured people who are unable to work due to illness. For this 
payment, individuals must attend their own GP to get a medical certificate. They may 
be required to attend a further medical assessment within the Department of Social 
Welfare, but this is at the discretion of the Deciding Officer.
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Figure 1.1: Description of Disability Payments in Ireland
Short-Term Long-Term
Injury B en e fit-----------------  OCCUPATIONAL INJURY  ► Disablement Benefit
Disability Benefit *-----------------  o t h e r  d i s a b i l i t y  Invalidity Pension
PRSI CONTRIBUTIONS
NO PRSI CONTRIBUTIONS
Y
Disability Allowance 
(Disabled Persons Maintenance Allowance, pre 1996)
Figure 1.2 shows that the proportion of the population in receipt of the main disability 
payments increased between 1995 and 2004. This could be a reflection of improved 
access and information to social welfare payments for people with disabilities (this 
could include those who were previously employed but now are aware of their 
entitlements). On the other hand, it could be that there has been mis-reporting of 
disability status. The proportions receiving benefit fluctuate for all age groups 
indicating that it is not just because individuals are getting more disabilities as they get 
older, but that there are other reasons for the fluctuation in the proportions getting these 
payments.
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Figure 1.2 Recipients of Disability Payments 1995-2004
Similar to the case of individuals who state their labour force status as unemployed, 
those who are near retirement age may also be prone to exaggerating their disability 
status, particularly if  financial incentives exist. A pre-retirement allowance is available 
for individuals who have been unemployed for over a year and are aged 55 and over. 
The number of people in receipt of this payment dropped from about 15,000 in 1994 to 
approximately 11,000 in 2004. For those who wish to ‘retire’ at an earlier age or were 
recently employed, social assistance is less available. Individuals must prove they are 
unable to find work, so in this case they may be more inclined to report a disability and 
apply for disability benefits. The health and retirement literature has focused on this 
issue for the US, UK and the Netherlands, but until recently there has been no 
comparable analysis for Ireland, possibly because of data limitations.
1.3 Theoretical Background
Consider a model where individuals make decisions based on comparisons of utility 
from different states. Their choice between consumption and leisure is considered as a 
lifetime decision, and we assume that individuals maximise their expected utility over 
their lifetime. Following Bound et al. (1999), the labour force participation decision is 
based on the assumption that individuals maximise the expected value of future utility:
T
maxE 'Y 'f l  U{C j ,L} ,Zj ) [1.1]
H
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where Cj and Lj are consumption and leisure in period j respectively. Zj is a vector of 
taste shifters and includes disability and Pj is the time-rate-of-preference discount factor.
The utility function is maximised subject to an intertemporal budget constraint:
AJ+] = (WjH j - C j )  + (l + rj+l)Aj  [1.2]
where W j is the wage, Hj is hours of work, Aj represents assets and rj is the rate of 
interest. Solving this model provides an expression for optimal leisure as a function of 
Wj, Hj, Aj and Zj. Theoretically, disability might influence each of these parameters. 
Depending on the nature of the disability, it might restrict the range of tasks the person 
can carry out, increase the costs of working, and affect the incentives faced -  most 
obviously via receipt of disability-related state transfers. The effect is reinforced if 
disability increases access to unearned income. On the demand side, employers may be 
reluctant to employ individuals with a disability, either because of concerns about their 
productivity or because of additional costs associated with accommodating certain types 
of disability.
The lifecycle model is the basic model for research on disability and labour force 
participation, so the literature differs mainly in terms of the way that disability enters 
the utility function and/or econometric models. In particular, disability may be 
endogenous with respect to participation either by reverse causality or via the influence 
of unobserved individual characteristics. Much of the earlier literature did not account 
for this possibility. In later years, it was recognised that endogeneity may lead to an 
overestimation of the impact of disability and therefore received greater attention in the 
literature. This led to a range of different econometric methodologies to resolve this 
problem. It was also recognised that measurement error in self-reported disability would 
impact on the true effect of disability on labour force participation and this led to further 
advancements in the econometric techniques applied to this model.
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Internationally, the first generation of econometric studies on the effect of disability on 
labour force participation emerged around the late 1970’s. For example, Bartel and 
Taubmann (1979) estimated an OLS model of weekly hours worked to analyse the 
effect of health on earnings and labour supply. Chirokos and Nestel (1985) estimated a 
Tobit model relating annual hours worked to health history by looking at the degree of 
poor, good, improved or deteriorating health over the previous ten years.
Bound (1991) looked further at the methodology used by previous research and gave a 
comprehensive critique concerning the use of self-reported disability. In this light, more 
recent research has emphasised the importance of the way health and limitations are 
captured, with the type of health status variable used leading to different patterns in 
terms of labour force participation. Wolfe and Hill (1995), for example, measure health 
status using an index of limitation in daily activities. Madden and Walker (1999) 
measure health in terms of those who report a longstanding illness or disability, and find 
that poor health does significantly reduce the hours worked for both men and women in 
the UK. Kidd, Sloane and Ferko (2000) analyse the effect of health limitations on the 
kind of paid work possible. They confirm the presence of substantial wage and 
participation rate differences between disabled and non-disabled individuals in the UK.
Previous studies analysing unobserved individual effects in this context emerged in the 
mid 1980’s. Sickles and Taubman (1986) were one of the first to use longitudinal data 
in estimating retirement decisions, and allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
retirement function. Estimating a binary random effects probit model, they allow for 
unobserved affects by simultaneously estimating the health and retirement equation, 
allowing the errors to be correlated. They allow for correlation of the unobserved effect 
with the disability variable, but they do not include the effect of labour market history. 
Their findings show that moving from poor health to good health decreases the 
probability of retirement, but they do not show how the health effect changes as a result 
of allowing for unobserved effects.
Bound (1991) looks at a retirement equation in the cross-sectional context, and shows 
that if the errors in the health and retirement equation are correlated, then there is an
1.4 Literature Review
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upward bias in the effect of health. He aims to identify the effects of financial incentives 
on reporting behaviour and retirement decisions, and investigates if  objective measures 
may be used as a proxy for subjective measures of health. The author concludes that the 
self-reported measure is not reliable in estimating the effect of health on retirement. 
Kreider (1999) also analyses work participation with cross-section methodology and 
arrives at the same conclusion. He finds that when the true measure of disability is used, 
the effect on participation is lower, by 17.2 per cent for men and 24.9 per cent for 
women. Both Bound (1991) and Kreider (1999) use cross-section data to estimate the 
true effect of disability on participation, but identification of their models requires a 
variable that affects health but that is not correlated with participation.
In addition to unobserved heterogeneity, the more recent research focused on reporting 
errors in the disability variable. Kreider (1999), Bound et al. (1999) and Lindeboom and 
Kerkhofs (2002), have all established that reporting errors lead to a bias in the effect of 
disability in a labour force participation model. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) show 
that self-assessed health reporting varies by labour force status and financial incentives, 
with the disabled group more likely to mis-report.
Although there has been much research on the topic of disability and labour force 
participation, there are still some gaps in the literature, which this thesis aims to fill. In 
terms of literature to date, two significant gaps emerge. Firstly there is no research on 
this topic in Ireland. Secondly, the only paper to deal with concurrent problems of 
endogeneity and measurement error is Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2002). The main 
drawback in their paper was the lack of a long panel of data. With two waves of data 
they required a simultaneous econometric specification. The availability of up to seven 
waves of panel data for the analysis in this thesis makes the process of estimation 
considerably more straight-forward. A common theme throughout this thesis and its 
contribution to this literature is in the way it deals with unobserved effects. To control 
for unobserved effects that may be correlated with disability a Mundlak (1978) 
estimator is applied to each model. In the dynamic model I follow the Wooldridge 
(2002) approach. This is a relatively new and underused approach to dealing with 
unobserved effects. The final part of this thesis applies a new approach to allow for both 
measurement error and endogeneity, combining the Mundlak approach of Chapter three 
with a cleansed measure of disability constructed from the generalised ordered probit
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model used in Chapter four. Compared to earlier research, this means we can 
distinguish between the two separate effects. The contribution of this thesis to the 
international use of applied econometric methodologies is summarised below and 
discussed in further detail within each chapter. Further technical details on these models 
are provided within each chapter.
1.5 Description of Living in Ireland Survey
The Living in Ireland Survey panel facilitates the use of the econometric models 
outlined above. The Survey was carried out each year from 1994 up to 2001, but 
information for the disability variable is only consistent from 1995 onwards, hence we 
concentrate the panel analysis on data from 1995-2001. The design is longitudinal, in 
that the same individuals are followed from one year to the next. Where possible each 
adult in the household was interviewed and the sample design aimed to produce a 
nationally representative sample. (Those living in institutions such as hospitals, nursing 
homes, convents, monasteries and prisons, were excluded from the target population). 
The survey thus provides not only a cross-sectional picture for each year, but also data 
that permits the analysis of changes over time. The size of the initial sample was 
substantially augmented in 2000 and all respondents were then followed up in 2001. We 
focus on individuals of working age, so we concentrate on the under 65 age group.
The Living in Ireland Survey obtained in-depth information about the current labour 
force status of each adult in sample households. We use all of this information to obtain 
an accurate indicator of labour force status -  reflecting participation (working or 
seeking work) or non-participation.
The Living in Ireland Survey also included some questions directly focused on illness or 
disability. Respondents were asked:
“Do you have any chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?”
It may well be that not only the presence of such an illness or disability but also the 
extent to which it limits or restricts a person may be important, so it is also important 
that the survey allows to distinguish:
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a) those reporting a chronic illness or disability and saying that it limits
them severely in their daily activities
b) those who report a chronic illness or disability and saying it limits
them to some extent, and
c) those who report such a condition but say it does not limit them at all
in their daily activities.
We should note that employers in Ireland, as in many other industrialised countries, are 
obliged by law to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ for those affected by disability. 
This may be achieved by changes in the work environment or in the way a job is 
performed, to enable a person with a disability to fully do a job and enjoy equal 
employment opportunities. For this reason, in the survey a person may respond as not 
limited in daily activities, but without adaptation it is possible that they should be 
classified as severely limited. The extent to which respondents say they are limited 
relates to their daily activities rather than work, but similar measures have been shown 
to have significant discriminatory power in terms of labour force participation in 
research elsewhere (e.g. Malo and Garcia-Serrano 2002).
This definition of disability is a standard measure used in many OECD countries - it 
conforms to the newer social model of disability whereby disability is seen as a 
consequence of social, attitudinal and environmental barriers that prevent people from 
participating in society. This model arises from a major shift in thinking about 
disability. Previously disability was viewed in terms of a medical model that focused on 
people’s impairments and viewed these people as different to the norm. The 
measurement of disability in a survey context therefore poses considerable definitional 
and methodological difficulties. These issues are the subject of widespread debate, not 
least in respect of the implications for measurement of a shift from a medical to a social 
model of disability (Nolan et al. 2003). Nonetheless, research from other countries has 
faced similar difficulties but has contributed significantly to the debate on disability and 
labour force participation. Analysis of the Living in Ireland Survey can therefore add 
substantially to what we know about disability and participation in Ireland.
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1.6 Summary of Chapters
Chapter two seeks to quantify the effects of disability on labour force participation in 
Ireland in a cross-sectional context. This provides baseline estimates of disability for the 
first time in Ireland. Using data from the Living in Ireland Survey it first looks at the 
relationship between current participation and current self-reported disability, with no 
controls for endogeneity or measurement error. The results show that those individuals 
reporting a severely limiting condition have a much lower probability of participation in 
the labour force than others, and this continues to be the case having controlled for other 
characteristics such as age, education and marital status. Chapter two also provides an 
analysis of the transitions into and out of disability and the related consequences for 
employment1. We compare the effect of onset, exit and persistent disability on the 
probability of employment. It looks at the characteristics associated with onset, exit and 
persistent disability and how this impacts on employment entry and exit. Pre-existing 
labour market disadvantage /selection effects are investigated. The results imply that 
employment policy should focus on the heterogeneity of disabled people, depending on 
their respective transitions into disability and the duration of their disability.
In Chapter three, the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is introduced. The dynamics 
of Chapter two are extended by exploring the channels through which previous 
disability affects levels of current participation. A range of panel models are considered, 
but our preferred model is a dynamic panel model. The estimation procedure has not 
previously been used in this context, so this chapter makes a significant contribution to 
the international literature. It shows how the estimates of current disability are changed 
once we control for the effect of past disability and previous participation. The results 
suggest that the base effect of disability is overestimated by between 40-60 per cent for 
men and by 5-10 per cent for women. An important finding from this paper is that the 
effect of past disability works via the channel of past non-participation.
Chapter four explores the possibility that reported limitations in daily activities are 
misreported, in particular for those who define their labour force status as disabled/ill,
1 This material is taken from a paper that is an invited contribution towards a special edition on 
‘Disability and Employment’ in an international journal ‘Estudios de Economia Aplicada’. Hence, we 
concentrate on the decision to work only, compared to those not working. All other econometric models 
focus on participation probabilities i.e. working or unemployed but actively seeking work versus not 
participating in the labour force.
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and assesses if financial incentives influence this group to mis-report. The main 
questions addressed are (1) was there state dependent reporting error and did economic 
incentives play a role, and (2) did this change over the years 1995 to 2001? Using a 
generalised ordered response model, cleansed measures of disability are calculated as 
predicted responses individuals would have made if employed. The results indicate that 
the disabled/ill group did over-report and the difference between actual and predicted 
probabilities only marginally changed between 1995 and 2001. When we control for 
unobserved heterogeneity the extent of measurement error is lower but still substantial, 
where almost 50 per cent of self-reports of severe limitations were mis-reports. Again, 
similar to the methodology for Chapter three, the final empirical model in this chapter 
has not been previously applied to measurement error of self-reported disability. In this 
context, this chapter gives added value to current international literature. International 
comparisons of mis-reporting behaviour are discussed and policy implications/lessons 
for Ireland are drawn from this analysis.
In Chapter five, the issues of unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error are 
brought together. The theoretical model is similar to that of Lindeboom and Kerkhofs
(2002) but the estimation strategy is different -  they use maximum likelihood 
simulation methods. However, because of the availability of a longer panel of data we 
use a less complicated methodology, namely the Mundlak (1978) estimator. Using the 
cleansed disability variable derived in the previous chapter, we differentiate between the 
impacts of classical and differential measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity.
Chapter six concludes the thesis and provides a brief summary of policy 
recommendations that were based on the findings of this research.
1.7 Conclusion
This introductory chapter set out the main issues addressed in this thesis. The overall 
aim is to estimate the impact of disability on labour force participation, while resolving 
the bias that results from unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error. The main 
findings are provided in detail within each chapter of this thesis, but in summary;
• disability does impact substantially on labour force participation;
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• this effect is lower once we control for unobserved heterogeneity and state 
dependence forms most of this unobserved effect;
• there is an element of mis-reporting among some labour force groups -  
particularly the disabled/ill and retired; differential measurement error is 
significant;
• these findings of measurement error are similar to results from research in other 
countries;
• the true impact of disability is to reduce participation by about 15 percentage 
points. Compared to the original estimate of 26 percentage points, about half of 
the bias is due to unobservables, and the remaining half is a combination of 
differential and classical measurement error;
• disability policy priorities include targeting re-integration into the labour force, 
effective monitoring of disability payments, awareness of differences among 
people with disabilities in terms of condition and duration of disability.
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Chapter Two
Disability and Labour Force Participation in Ireland
2.1 Introduction
While the likely linkages between disability, non-employment and poverty have been 
highlighted in an Irish policy context (see for example Combat Poverty Agency/Forum 
of People with Disabilities/National Rehabilitation Board 1994), this has been on the 
basis of very little direct representative evidence about disability and the labour market. 
Helping to fill this gap, this chapter analyses for the first time the factors associated 
with participation or non-participation in the labour market by people with disabilities 
in Ireland, firstly using cross-section data and then applying panel data to look at 
transitions in disability and work.
Our econometric analysis of the relationship between disability and labour force 
participation incorporates a range of socio-economic characteristics into the analysis, in 
order to isolate insofar as possible the impact of disability itself. The results suggest that 
individuals reporting a limiting disability have a substantially lower probability of 
participation in the labour force than others.
2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Background
The theoretical model has been outlined in Chapter one. Evidence for other countries 
does indeed suggest that employment rates for working-age individuals with a disability 
are lower than those for the rest of the working-age population. The motivation for 
trying to understand exactly why this comes about and how best to address it is not 
straightforward, given the range of direct and indirect implications it has for income and 
living standards and for social participation more broadly. Indeed, there has been a
recent surge of interest in this topic in countries such as the UK, the USA and Germany,
_ ____
and in comparative analysis in an OECD and EU context. This reflects inter alia a 
dawning realisation of the scale of spending on disability-related programmes -  on 
average, OECD countries spend at least twice as much on such programmes as they do 
on unemployment programmes (OECD 2003). Disability benefit recipiency rates have 
been increasing in many countries, and such programmes typically account for at least
2 See especially European Commission (2001), OECD (2003).
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10% of social spending. Furthermore, evidence from these countries suggests that 
disability-related benefit receipt is very likely to be long-lasting.
Understanding the relationship between disability and labour force participation is 
critically important, but it also gives rise to analytical challenges. The first 
complication, as in many other instances where one is trying to quantify the factors 
affecting labour market behaviour, is that individuals may differ in many respects other 
than presence or severity of disability, and it may be difficult to disentangle their 
effects. The second complication, specific to this application, is that the way in which 
disability itself is captured may be problematic, in that it may not be independent of 
labour market participation itself.
Our aim in this chapter is to produce estimates of the relationship between disability and 
labour force participation in Ireland for the first time. The results allow us to see first 
the extent to which those reporting chronic illness or disability limiting them in varying 
degrees are actually participating in the labour force. Secondly, we are able to control 
for a range of other socio-economic characteristics of the individual that might be 
expected to affect his or her labour force participation, thus isolating to some extent the 
impact of disability itself. The availability of a rich panel data-set allows us to also 
investigate transitions in disability and work.
There is however an important caveat to be noted. The possible endogeneity of self- 
reported health, which we have to rely on, has been noted in a number of studies (see 
for example Bound and Burkhauser 1999). Those not active in the labour market might 
be more likely than others (with the same actual disability status) to report themselves 
as disabled, for several reasons. One is that the presence of a limiting disability provides 
a justification for not being in work that is less open to stigmatisation. Another is that 
the individual may be in receipt of benefits that are linked to the presence of disability 
or incapacity to work, which could well affect their reporting behaviour. As we 
mentioned in Chapter one this could bias the results of an analysis which treats self- 
reported health as exogenous, as we do now in this chapter. We return to the 
implications in our concluding section.
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The Living in Ireland data used in this chapter has been described in Chapter one. In 
this chapter we analyse the cross-sectional data from the 2000 survey, when the size of 
the sample was enhanced. We wish to focus on individuals of working age, so we 
exclude those aged 65 or over. The youngest individuals in this sample are aged 16 and 
the number of males and females are 3,315 and 3,362 respectively. The disability 
measure is constructed on the basis of individuals responding to the following question: 
“Do you have any chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?”
The extent to which respondents say they are limited relates to their daily activities 
rather than work, but similar measures have been shown to have significant 
discriminatory power in terms of labour force participation in research elsewhere (e.g. 
Malo and Garcia-Serrano 2002). Furthermore, in Table 2.1 we see that there are 
different rates of employment and inactivity for each sub-group, suggesting it will be 
important to distinguish between the different levels of disability in our analysis of 
labour force participation. For instance, individuals with severe limitations are three 
times more likely to be inactive than those with no chronic illness or disability.
2.3 Data
Table 2.1 Labour Force Status by level of restriction, 2000
Severely L im ited Lim ited to 
some extent
N ot L im ited No chronic 
illness or 
disability
Employed 18.9 35.9 57.1 68.1
Unemployed 
but seeking 
work
4.0 8.4 9.6 7.1
Inactive 77.1 55.7 33.3 24.8
N 153 548 294 5622
The effects of disability on labour force participation may differ among individuals 
depending on other characteristics for example age or education. We therefore include 
measures of age, education, region, unearned income, age of youngest child and marital 
status in our analysis. These variables are defined in detail and summary statistics are 
provided in Table A2.1.
A study carried out for the Equality Authority, entitled Disability and Labour Market Participation in 
Ireland (Gannon and Nolan 2004a), also used data from the Quarterly National Household Survey 
(QNHS) Disability Module 2002 to provide a descriptive account o f  the employment status o f  people 
reporting long-standing chronic illness or disability. Patterns o f  disability and employment are the same 
from both sources. We also applied the baseline model o f  current disability and participation to the QNHS 
data, and we found similar results to those found in this chapter, (see Gannon and Nolan 2004b).
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Before looking at the relationship between disability and labour force participation in 
more detail, the remainder of this section looks at dynamics of disability. In particular 
we distinguish between onset, exit and persistent disability. We begin by looking at 
those actually observed in the panel survey to experience onset, exit and persistent 
disability and show some summary statistics. Following Jenkins and Rigg (2003) we 
label movements into chronic illness and disability as ‘onset’ -  because we can then see 
what happens to the outcomes we are interested in, i.e. employment as disability occurs. 
In doing so it is helpful to first identify all those individuals who are “at risk of onset” at 
a particular point, and see how many actually experience onset. We can then compare 
the outcomes of interest for those experiencing onset with those who were “at risk” but 
did not experience it. Those who are already reporting disability are not by definition 
“at risk” -  we cannot observe them experiencing onset. Similarly we define ‘at risk of 
exit’ for individuals who experienced disability for two years and ‘exit’ for those who 
then left the state of disability after two years of ‘at risk’. Persistent disability is defined 
as having a disability throughout the panel. With the exception of persistent disability, 
all trajectories are measured in two year events, to try and minimise the incidence of 
short term disabilities/chronic illnesses.
A total of 2,309 adults aged 15-65 were followed throughout the period from 1995 to 
2001, so we have (2,309 x 7) = 16,163 observations in all. Out of these observations or 
“person-waves”, the respondent reported having a chronic illness or disability in 2,489 
cases or 16% of the total -  so that is the average cross-sectional disability rate over the 
period. However, not all the observations will be included as “at risk of onset” -  
because some people reported disability throughout and thus were never “at risk” in that 
sense, for example. We provide numbers of observations and adults in onset and exit 
disability states in Table A2.2. This shows that 1,972 persons were “at risk of onset” 
over a total of 6,997 observations or person-waves when we use a two-year definition of 
“at risk”. A total of 166 individuals are then observed to experience onset, in other 
words start reporting the presence of a chronic illness or disability and do so for at least 
two years in a row. The number of persons “at risk of exit” is much smaller than the 
numbers at risk of onset. However, a higher proportion then exit: 138 exits are 
observed, out of a total of 755 “opportunities to exit” -  occasions when someone in the 
sample had reported disability in the previous two years and was then observed for two
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more years. In terms of persistent disability, there are 124 individuals in the sample 
reported disability in each year from 1995 to 2001, representing almost 6 per cent of all 
respondents.
In Table 2.2 we present some summary statistics for individuals in each of the three 
disability states. Onset of chronic illness/disability is more likely to be reported by older 
people and by those with lower levels of education qualifications. The probability of 
onset rises sharply for those over 55 years of age and is much higher for those with no 
educational qualifications beyond primary level than for those with higher attainment 
levels -  which is in itself associated with age, since older people have lower levels of 
education on average than younger ones. The opposite pattern to that seen for those 
experiencing onset is evident for people with an exit from disability. The percentage 
exiting (as a proportion of all those at risk) seems to fall with age and with level of 
educational attainment. It also suggests women were more likely to exit than men. 
Looking in a descriptive fashion at the characteristics of those experiencing disability 
throughout the panel, we see from Table 2.2 that persistent disability is most frequent in 
the older age groups and the lowest educational attainment categories.
Table 2.2 Chronic Illness/Disability by Selected Characteristics
% at risk and % at risk and % experiencing
experiencing onset experiencing exit persistent chronic
o f  chronic from  chronic illness/disability
illness/disability illness/disability
Gender
Men 1.9 9.4 6.2
Women 2.1 16.6 4.0
Age
15-24 0.6 20.0 1.5
25-34 1.7 20.0 3.2
35-44 1.3 12.7 4.0
45-54 1.7 13.7 6.8
55-64 3.9 8.5 7.5
Education
Primary/none 3.5 9.5 10.0
Secondary 1.5 15.3 3.3
Third level 1.2 21.8 2.0
We can look further into the incidence of onset, exit or persistent disability for each type 
of characteristic while controlling for the influence of other individual and household
2 4
characteristics by estimating a logistic model. We estimate a latent variable model and 
probabilities are calculated as:
D*i = X UP  + uH [2.1]
where D*t is the underlying latent variable that indexes the measure of disability, u n is 
the random error term with a logistic distribution, X u is a column vector of explanatory 
variables, and [3 is a column vector of parameters to be estimated. The dependent
variable is dit =1 if D*u > 0 or du = 0  ifD* < 0 . This model is estimated as a
maximum likelihood logit model and
= (2.2]
Because we are using panel data, we estimate a pooled logistic model and adjust the 
standard errors for clustering at the individual level.
In Table 2.3 column l4, we predict the likelihood that someone who was at risk of onset 
will then report a chronic illness or disability, depending on a set of characteristics that 
we believe might affect that probability. The explanatory variables we use include age, 
gender, education, labour force status and household composition. Since some of these 
(for example labour force status) may well be influenced by chronic illness or disability, 
for those with a disability onset we use values for the explanatory variables measured 
two years before onset, while for those with no onset we use the values in the first year 
they are observed in the panel, i.e. 1995. The results show that age is statistically 
significant in predicting onset, with the likelihood of onset increasing sharply as one 
moves from below 45 to 45-54, and then 55-64. Having no educational qualifications 
increases the odds of becoming disabled, most likely this effect is channelled via the 
subsequent occupational choice and/or social disadvantage. Individuals in households
4 For comparison with similar research in the U K  (Jenkins and Rigg, 2003) we present the results as log
odds, expressed as a linear function o f  the explanatory variables, ln (—^  —^ ——) =  X it(5 . The
1 - p ( d tt \ X U)
effect o f  a unit change in X  on the log odds o f  the event occurring is thus given by the P coefficient.
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w ith one child less likely to have an onset o f  disability. This is an unexpected resu lt and 
m ay be correlated w ith gender and/or the num ber o f  adults in a household. The other 
socio-dem ographic characteristics are not statistically  significant in  d istinguishing those 
w ho experience onset -  the small num ber o f  cases observed to do so, reduces the 
likelihood o f  detecting such effects. W ith the exception  o f  the results for the variables o f  
one child and working, these results are sim ilar to those found by  Jenkins and R igg
(2003) using  the BH PS data.
The relationship betw een poverty and d isab ility  onset is o f  particular interest. O nset 
m ight well lead to an increased risk o f  en tering  poverty , bu t the relationship  m ay also 
work the other way: people already in  poverty  m ay  be m ore susceptible to chronic 
illness/disability  onset, as the extensive research literature on health  inequalities 
suggests (Burchardt, 2003). To explore this w e tested  incom e poverty  status before 
onset as an explanatory variable. This w as m easured by  w hether the individual was in a 
household falling below  60%  o f  m edian incom e in the sam ple, w hich is a w idely  used 
m easure o f  poverty. This turned out to be  significant, w ith  individuals liv ing  in  such 
households 1.7 tim es m ore likely to experience onset o f  chronic illness or d isab ility  than 
others.
The causal relationship betw een poverty, education, labour force status and the onset o f  
chronic illness/d isability  is o f  course a very  com plex one, w ith  all these outcom es being  
inter-linked and each bo th  affecting and poten tially  affected by  disability. The relatively  
small num bers in the surveys observed w ith d isab ility  onset lim it the depth  in  w hich this 
can be explored, bu t these results provide useful background to the analysis o f  w hat 
happens to em ploym ent as onset occurs. As w ell as analysing w hat happens w hen 
som eone starts a period o f  disability, we look at w hat happens to em ploym ent w hen a 
disability spell ends, and so w e now  turn  to how  that is captured in  the survey  and how  
m any people are observed as “exiting” disability.
In the sam e table, colum n 2, we present estim ates for the probability  o f  exit from  a 
disability. H ow ever, w e do not find significant age (except for those aged 35-44) or 
education effects; it does suggest that w om en, those w ho are in  w ork (prior to exit) and
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those w ith tw o or m ore children are m ore likely  to  exit d isability .5 The significant effect 
o f  age 35-44 could be related to labour m arket status, and the im portance o f  returning to 
w ork follow ing a short-term  disability.
The regression analysis presented in  colum n 3, suggests that those w ith  low  education 
and those aged 35 or over are indeed m ore likely  than better educated and/or younger 
respondents to have experienced persisten t disability. O n the other hand, w om en, those 
w ho w ere in  w ork w hen first observed in  1995, and those w ith  tw o or m ore children 
have a reduced probability  o f  experiencing persisten t d isability .6
Table 2.3 Logistic Regression Model of Chronic Illness/disability
O dds Ratio
Probability  o f  O nset P robability  o f  exit Probability  o f
o f  disability from  disability persisten t disability
Fem ale 1.2350 2.2120* 0.3456**
No education 1.5093** 0.7104 2.0133**
qualifications
W orking 1.1724 1.9657** 0.1743**
Tw o adults 0.9636 1.2772 0.8422
Three + adults 0.9683 0.7861 0.8464
O ne child 0.5941** 1.3389 0.7011
Tw o+ children 1.0191 1.8612* 0.5147**
A ge 25-34 1.8902 0.3878 2.6970*
35-44 1.7494 0.3162** 4.3517**
45-54 2.7234*** 0.4785 3.6792**
55-64 6.7983** 0.4225 2.1617
Y ear 1.0434 0.8302* 0.9981
N 6997 755 15332
Pseudo R- 0.0492 0.0657 0.1277
squared___________________
Note: * * p <  0 .05 ,*p  < 0.10
2.4 Methodology
H aving looked in detail at the pattern  o f  d isab ility  in the sam ple, w e now  look at the 
im pact o f  d isability  on labour force participation. W e begin  by  looking  at the im pact o f  
current d isab ility  on current labour force participation. W e assum e that an ind iv idual’s
5 Poverty status was also tested in the statistical model, but unlike the results for disability onset did not 
prove significant in predicting exit.
6 Once again w e also tested poverty status in the statistical model but it was not significant in this case.
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labour force participation decision is determ ined by  a com parison o f  the offer w age and 
their reservation wage, w here they w ill participate i f  the offer w age is higher. W e do not 
d irectly  observe the reservation wage, but w e do know  the outcom e o f  their 
participation decision, so our dependent variable LFP (L abour Force Participation) is a 
d ichotom ous variable d istinguishing participants (those in w ork or unem ployed but 
actively  seeking work) from  non-participants. U nem ployed individuals w ho are not 
seeking w ork are counted as non-participants. The structure o f  the error term  in  the 
labour force participation m odel determ ines the appropriate m odel o f  estim ation. W e 
assum e that the error is norm ally distributed, and use a m axim um  likelihood probit 
m odel to predict the probability  o f  participating in the labour force.
The dependent variable is y ;= l i f  y t >  0  or yj=0 i f  y t ^  0 ,  and the latent variable 
equation is
y* = x ,fi + u , . [2.3]
y* is the underlying latent variable that indexes the m easure o f  labour force 
participation, ut is the norm ally  distributed stochastic error term , X\ is a colum n vector 
o f  explanatory variables, and /? is a colum n vector o f  param eters to b e  estim ated.
T he estim ated co-efficients from  the probit m odel provide an indication o f  the direction 
o f  effect o f  an explanatory variable on this probability . In order to determ ine the change 
in  predicted  probabilities in percentage points, that are associated w ith changes in  the 
explanatory variables, w e present also the partial effects. M arginal probability  effects 
are the partial effects o f  each explanatory variable on the probability  that the observed 
dependent variable equals 1. Firstly, we determ ine the probability  o f  labour force 
participation as:
P{LFP{ = l \ X , )  = F( X . p )  =  <D(XlP)  . [2.4]
I f  the explanatory variable is continuous, then w e calculate the m arginal probability  
effect w ith  respect to X k  as:
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dPjLFP; = 1) ctt>{X]ß)
dXik ~ dXik
= *{x \ß )^ - = ^ x\ß)ßkt
ik
[2.5]
w here k  is the &-th elem ent in  X h and (|) is the standard norm al density  function. In 
practice, the X ,  is calculated at the m eans o f  the independent variables.
M ost o f  our explanatory variables are dichotom ous dum m y variables so the m arginal 
probability  effects m ay  be in terpreted as the change in p robability  o f  labour force 
participation resulting  from  a change in  one category o f  a variable to another, and we 
calculate these effects for a d iscrete variab le X  as
P(LFP, = 1 1 x ik = 1) -  (P iLFP, = 1 1 x ik = 0) = <&{X'uß )  -  ® (X 'luß ) , w here X u is a
vector o f  explanatory variables w ith X ik - 1, and X 0i is a vector o f  explanatory 
variables w ith X ik = 0 .  X u and X 0i are calculated at the m eans o f  the other
So far w e are assum ing that each o f  the explanatory variables has constant differential 
effects, e.g. w e are assum ing that i f  there is a low er probability  o f  labour force 
participation for the severely  disabled, then this is so w hether they  are young or old. 
H ow ever, it m ay be the case that for exam ple individuals aged 45-54 w ho are severely 
disabled m ay  show  a low er p robability  o f  labour force participation. In other w ords, 
there m ay  be interactions betw een  the two variables severely  d isabled and age 45-54. In 
this case, their effect on our outcom e variable, LFP, m ay  not be sim ply additive, but 
m ultiplicative. For this reason, w e test several specifications o f  our m odels w ith 
interactions effects. For exam ple, i f  w e m odel labour force participation  as:
independent variables7.
y *  = Z \ ß x +  Z 2ß 2 + Z \ ß 3 +  u i , w here y r l  i f  y* > 0 [2.6]
0 otherwise,
and Zj = X x, Z 2 = X 2 Z 3 = X ^ X 2.
1 Alternatively, we could estimate the marginal effects at every observation and then use the sample 
average o f  the individual marginal effects, but in large samples both approaches give the same answer, 
(Greene, 2000).
In this model, X2 affects the impact of X] and the partial effect is calculated as:
-  m m + p , x 2)
dXn dXn dXn [2.7]
Because the patterns of labour force participation for men and women may be rather 
different, we estimate separate equations for each. Firstly we estimate the effect of 
disability on labour force participation focusing purely on the categories, (1) 
Ill/Disabled with severe limitation (2) Ill/Disabled with some limitation and (3) 
Ill/Disabled with no limitation. These effects may be influenced by the age, marital 
status and educational qualifications of an individual, and these variables are added as a 
second set of explanatory of variables in the second regression we will report. The age 
of children may have an important influence on the labour force participation decision 
for women. These variables are included as part of a final set of explanatory variables in 
the second regression we report. For ease of comparison of the estimates between men 
and women, the child variables are included for men also. We then include interaction 
terms based on education and age.
As noted in Section 2.2, the nature of the variable being used to capture disability is 
critical. Disability is entirely self-reported rather than externally observed, and the 
nature of that reporting process may have implications for the weight to be placed on 
the results. We return below to this issue and its implications for interpreting our results, 
having presented the results of estimating the model described.
2.5 Results for Model of Labour Force Participation
We now present the results of estimating the probit model of labour force participation 
described in Section 2.4 with Living in Ireland survey data for 2000. We look first at 
results for men, then for women, and then explore possible interaction effects.
2.5.1 Results for Men
The estimation results for men are presented in Table 2.4. It is interesting to look first at 
the overall goodness of fit of the model and how it changes as we add explanatory 
variables, as reflected in the McFadden R2. Initially this has a value of 0.1073, meaning
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that the model using only disability status to explain labour force participation perfonns 
10.7% better than one that specifies the probability of labour force participation as a 
constant. When we add age, marital status, education and number of children this 
increases considerably to 0.2465.
Table 2.4 shows that when only the three variables capturing chronic illness or 
disability are included as explanatory factors, men with a chronic illness or disability 
which limits them severely in their daily activities have on average a reduction of 58 
percentage points in the probability of being in the labour force, relative to men without 
a chronic illness or disability. Men with a chronic illness which limits them in then- 
daily activities “to some extent” also have a substantially reduced probability of being 
in the labour force, though the reduction of about 36 percentage points is a good deal 
less than for those who are severely limited. Finally, men with a chronic illness that 
does not limit them in their daily activities have a probability of being in the labour 
force that is not significantly different to those without such a condition.
These figures take no account of the fact that those reporting a chronic condition may 
also differ in other ways that could influence their labour force participation. They could 
for example be older or less well educated on average, and that could help to explain 
their lower levels of labour force participation. So the second column of Table 2.4 
shows the estimation results when the full set of explanatory variables is included in the 
estimated model, controlling for differences in age, education, marital status and 
number of children. The effect of a severely limiting disability on labour force 
participation actually rises slightly, although the difference is not statistically 
significant. That effect falls for those who are ill/disabled with some limitation, from 36 
to 30 percentage points, while the effect for reporting illness/disability with no 
limitation remains insignificant.
In terms of the other explanatory variables, labour force participation increases with age 
up to 54 compared to those aged 55-64, men with secondary or third level education 
have a greater probability of participating in the labour market than those with no 
qualifications, and the probability of participation is slightly higher for men who have 
children aged between 12 and 18.
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Table 2.4 Marginal Effects, Men, 2000
Marginal Effect with 
No Controls
Marginal Effect with 
Controls
Disabled with severe limitation in daily -0.5796** -0.6101**
activities (0.0464) (0.0502)
Disabled with some limitation in daily -0.3599** -0.2948**
activities (0.0313) (0.0326)
Disabled with no limitation in daily -0.0132 -0.0117
activities (0.0339) (0.0297)
A ge 15-24 -0.0147
(0.0245)
25-34 0.1142**
(0.0117)
35-44 0.1054**
(0.0125)
45-54 0.0864**
(0.0119)
Married
**
0.0736
(0.0205)
Unearned Incom e/100 -0.0002
(0.0019)
Secondary education 0.0819**
(0.0156)
Third level education 0.0916**
(0.0108)
Border, Midlands, W est Regions 0.0031
(0.0113)
A ge youngest child <4 0.0402
(0.0256)
>=4 and <12 0.0156
(0.0221)
>=12 and <18 0.0411**
(0.0169)
McFadden R2 0.1073 0.2484
N  observations 3315 3315
Note: **p < 0.05,*p <0.10
2.5.2 Results for Women
The estimation results for women are shown in Table 2.5, and show a similar pattern to 
those for men. Before controlling for other characteristics, on average women with a 
chronic illness or disability which limits them severely in their daily activities have a
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probability of being active in the labour force that is 51 percentage points lower than 
women with no chronic illness or disability. Women with a condition that is limiting “to 
some extent” have a reduction of 26 percentage points in their probability of 
participation. These are slightly smaller negative effects than for men in the same 
illness/disability situation. Unlike men, though, women with a chronic illness or 
disability that does not limit them in their daily activities are also less likely to be in the 
labour force.
When we control for age, education, and other factors, as for men the impact of a 
severely limiting disability is effectively unchanged, at about a 52 percentage points 
reduction. For women with a condition that is limiting “to some extent” that reduction is 
now 22 percentage points. Women with a non-limiting chronic illness or disability are 7 
percentage points more likely to participate compared to non-disabled women, but this 
is only significant at the 10% level.
As far as other variables are concerned, the effects of age, education, marital status and 
the presence of young children all have the impact on the probability of participation 
that would be expected from previous studies, with participation for example lower for 
married women and those with young children and higher for those with third-level 
education.
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Table 2.5 Marginal Effects, Women, 2000
Marginal Effect with 
No Controls
Marginal Effect with 
Controls
Disabled with severe limitation in daily -0.5140** -0.5245
activities (0.0339) (0.0379)
Disabled with some limitation in daily -0.2599**
**
-0.2164
activities (0.0296) (0.0332)
Disabled with no limitation in daily -0.1259** -0.0708*
activities (0.0405) (0.0434)
Age 15-24
4e 4e
0.1327
(0.0364)
25-34 0.3645**
(0.0239)
35-44 0.3277**
(0.0259}
45-54 0.2631
(0.0255)
Married -0.0818**
(0.0281)
Unearned Income/100 -0.0060
(0.0029)
Secondary education 0.2233**
(0.0244)
Third level education 0.3904**
(0.0195)
Border, Midlands, W est Regions
**
-0.0463
(0.0204)
Age youngest child <4 -0.2093**
(0.0346)
>=4 and <12 -0.1141
(0.0333)
>=12 and <18 -0.0388
(0.0320)
McFadden R2 0.0311 0.1481
N  observations 3362 3362
Note: * *p < 0.05,*p <0.10
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2.5.3 Testing for Interactions
The models presented so far have implicitly assumed that the effect of disability on 
labour force participation is constant across for example different age groups or 
education levels. However, the impact of disability may in fact be more or less 
pronounced depending on the age or education level of the individual affected, and this 
could be important in understanding these effects and framing policies to reduce them. 
Including interactions between the explanatory variables in our estimated models can 
capture such inter-relationships, so we test a variety of such interactions.
Table A2.3 shows the estimated interaction terms for education and illness/disability, 
for both men and women. There are very few individuals in the survey with third level 
education and a severe limitation (5 men and 5 women) and few women with secondary 
education and a severe limitation (27 women), so we combine the categories severely 
and some extent limited for both men and women and focus on the interaction terms 
between limited in daily activities and types of education. None of these interaction 
terms are significant for women, indicating that the effects of disability are similar 
across all education groups. For men, we find significant effects of secondary education 
for those with severely or to some extent limiting disabilities. Men with a disability that 
does not limit them in daily activities who have third level education are not statistically 
different to men with no disability.
One might expect that the effects of disability on labour force participation would vary 
with age so another interesting interaction is disabled/limitation with age group (all 
interaction results are available from the author on request). For women, we find that 
two interactions are significant -  limited to some extent and age either 25-34 or 35-44 
and the marginal effects are -0.23 and -0.17 respectively. This means that women aged 
25-34 would see a further reduction in their labour force probability due to a somewhat 
limiting disability, of 23 percentage points. For women aged 35-44, this further 
reduction is 17 percentage points compared to women in other age categories. We also 
find that women aged 45-54 who are disabled but not limited in daily activities are more 
likely to participate, the marginal effect of the interaction is 21 percentage points. For 
men, there are two significant interaction effects. Men who are aged 35-44 and are 
severely limited have a further reduction in labour force probability of 25 percentage 
points, compared to other individuals in other age groups and also with a severely
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limiting disability. For those who are limited to some extent, they are 9 percentage 
points more likely to participate if aged 15-24.
2.6 Results for Disability transitions and work
We now make use of the panel data 1995-2001 and the dynamic information in relation 
to disability onset, exit and persistence to deepen our understanding of the impact of 
disability on paid work. The previous section showed that those reporting a chronic 
illness or disability are much less likely to be in employment than those who say they 
have no such illness or disability.
However, some key points must be kept in mind in interpreting this cross-sectional 
pattern for people with disabilities. Not all of that difference in employment rates may 
be attributable to the presence or absence of disability per se, because those who report 
disability may also have other characteristics that disadvantage them in the labour 
market -  for example in terms of age, gender, education and skills, or geographic 
location. Interpretation is further complicated by the fact that some of those other 
disadvantages may themselves sometimes have been affected by the presence of a long­
standing disability -  for example, the level of education and skills acquired. Finally, it is 
not so much the presence of disability itself as the extent to which it restricts the 
individual and the way that it is perceived in the labour market, as well as the extent of 
broader societal barriers to participation, that matter in terms of employment outcomes.
We now build on the results of section 2.5 to deepen the dynamic analysis of disability 
and labour force participation. We start by comparing the employment probability of 
persons reporting an onset of disability with those who were at risk but did not 
experience onset. We then look at employment rates for those who “exit” from a spell of 
chronic illness or disability. Finally, we focus on the employment situation of those who 
reported persistent disability over the course of the panel survey.
Table 2.6 shows the work status of such individuals one year before the onset of 
illness/disability, in the year of onset, and in the year following onset of the 
illness/disability.
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Table 2.6 Employment Status for Those With Onset of Disability
1 year before onset Year of onset of Year after Onset
chronic
illness/disability
Employed
Non-employed
%
61.4
38.5
%
46.4
53.6
%
42.8
57.2
N=166
We see that around 60% of those who become ill or disabled were in employment in the 
years before onset. Their employment rate falls to about 46% in the year of onset of the 
illness or disability. One year after onset the employment rate remains well below what 
it was before the onset of chronic illness or disability, and the inactivity rate is over half 
compared with one-third before onset.
These figures, although still based on only a relatively small number of cases in the 
data, certainly suggest that onset of disability is indeed associated with a substantial 
decline in the employment rate. Two further points are worth noting about the level of 
their employment rate before and after onset. The first is that even before onset their 
employment rate was below the overall average, at about 60% rather than 70%. 
Secondly, though, their employment rate in the year after onset, at just over 40%, is as 
low as the overall average for all those reporting chronic illness or disability, which will 
include some people who have been in that situation for much longer (as well as some 
only reporting it for the first time). So in terms of the 40%-70% contrast in employment 
rates between those with versus without a disability (see Gannon and Nolan 2004a), for 
these individuals about two-thirds of that gap seems to be reasonably attributable to the 
onset of disability and the fact that it has lasted at least over two waves of the panel; the 
remaining one-third of the gap is then attributable to “selection effects” -  the pre­
existing labour market disadvantages that these individuals had, in terms of education 
etc., before onset.
It is particularly interesting to know what distinguishes the people who leave 
employment following onset of a chronic illness or disability from those who do not, so 
we look at their profiles in terms of some key characteristics. Table 2.7 compares the 
profile of those who leave employment in the year of onset, those who remain employed 
in the year of onset but have left by the following year, and those who remained in
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employment throughout. We see that women and persons with no educational 
qualifications constitute a much higher proportion of those who leave employment than 
of those who do not. On the other hand the groups are not markedly different in terms of 
age or family composition. Unfortunately the sample sizes in these different groups are 
not large enough to support a formal statistical analysis to see whether these suggestive 
differences are in fact significant in statistical terms.
Table 2.7 Characteristics of Onset by Employment Status
E m ployed  in yea r  
before onset, not 
em ployed in y e a r  o f  
onset
E m ployed  in yea r  
before and  y e a r  o f  
onset, no t em ployed  in 
yea r  a fter onset
E m ployed  in 
y e a r  before, o f  
and  after onset
%
Female 59 64 40
No qualifications 45 54 29
Mean age 45 52 46
Mean number of 1.0 0.6 0.8
children
Mean number of 2.4 2.7 2.5
adults
N 102 77 71
We now estimate a probit model to see how much disability onset seems to affect the 
probability of leaving work having been employed in the previous year. This allows us 
to look at the contribution which disability onset on its own makes, having controlled 
for other factors. It calculates probabilities relative to the omitted reference category, 
and the results are in Table 2.8 in terms of the implied marginal effects of each variable 
compared with someone who did not experience onset, is a man, is in the omitted age 
category of under 25 etc.
The first column of the table shows that if the only explanatory variable included in the 
model is disability onset, then individuals with an onset are 23 percentage points more 
likely to stop working than the omitted category, who were at risk but did not 
experience onset. About 5% of that reference category stopped working from one year 
to the next, so this is the baseline figure against which the effects of an onset of chronic 
illness or disability are assessed. This means that about 28 per cent of people with an 
onset will stop work compared to only 5 per cent of those without an onset.
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Table 2.8 Probability of Stopping Work
Onset o f  Chronic +P ersona l + H ousehold +Education
Illness/Disability C haracteristics circum stances
Only
Onset of chronic
illness/disability 0.2314** 0.2082** 0.2043** 0.1939**
Female 0.0650** 0.0649** 0.0673**
Age 25-34 -0.0233** -0.0224** -0.0247**
35-44 -0.0292** -0.0351** -0.0391**
45-54 -0.0291** -0.0309** -0.0369**
55-64 0.0010 0.0081 -0.0057
2 adults in household -0.0040 -0.0012
3 or more adults in
household 0.0060 0.0059
1 child in household 0.0088 0.0078
2 or more children in
household 0.0309** 0.0296**
No education
qualifications 0.0357**
Year -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.0024
R squared 0.0261 0.0769 0.0843 0.0919
N 4802 4802 4802 4802
Note: * *p  < 0.05,*p  <0.10
When we control for age and gender in the second column, we see that women and 
older workers are more likely to stop working, and when this is taken into account the 
estimated effect of disability onset falls slightly to 20 percentage points. In the third 
column we incorporate some household characteristics as explanatory variables, and see 
that individuals in households with two or more children are more likely to stop 
working, but the estimated effect of disability is not affected. In the final column we 
introduce having no educational qualifications and this does increase the individual’s 
probability of stopping work, but once again this makes no difference to the impact of 
disability onset. So the results of formal statistical analysis confirm the broad picture 
conveyed by the comparison of employment rates before and after disability onset, that 
a reduction of about 20 percentage points is associated with onset.
As noted earlier, it is not only the presence but also the severity of a chronic illness or 
disability that may be critical in determining its impact. We can examine this by 
replacing the variable capturing disability onset with three variables, for onset of a 
chronic illness or disability that hampers the person in their daily activities severely, to 
some extent, or not at all. The results show that those reporting onset but not hampered
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in daily activities have a lower probability of working by 10 percentage points, 
compared to those without an onset of chronic illness or disability. For those who are 
hampered severely or to some extent by the chronic illness or disability, the percentage 
predicted to be working is much lower; the predicted impact of onset of a hampering 
disability is now a reduction of the order of 30 percentage points, controlling for other 
factors. There are however very few cases where we observe onset of a severely 
hampering disability, so the effect of onset of a disability that hampers severely versus 
to some extent cannot be reliably distinguished.
As well as the individual’s own characteristics and their household composition, it 
might well be that the economic circumstances in which they find themselves affect 
whether they stay in employment having experienced onset of disability. In particular, 
being in a disadvantaged household before onset may affect the relationship between 
disability onset and employment. We tested for such an effect by including as an 
additional explanatory variable whether in the year before onset the person was in a 
household falling below 60% of median income. The results show that coming from 
such a household does increase the likelihood that the person will stop working, by 
about 7 percentage points. This may be related to a range of factors such as disability or 
education levels. Those who experience disability onset may do so because their level of 
income was so low that leaving their jobs and becoming dependent on social transfers is 
a profitable option. Their reservation wages may be pushed up, therefore hindering their 
labour participation. In our model, the effects of onset remain the same when we include 
previous poverty status -  however, due to the potential endogeneity of poverty status, it 
is difficult to conclude whether or not those in lower income are more likely to leave
• • Rwork after disability onset .
If the likelihood of being in work declines substantially when disability onset occurs, it 
is also clearly of interest to look at what happens when someone who has been reporting 
a chronic illness or disability stops doing so -  does their employment rate go back up? 
We now turn to exit from disability and the probability of being in work. In terms of 
exit from disability, we found there were 72 cases in the sample aged under 65 who
8 Earlier on in this chapter, we saw that poverty does impact on disability onset, so there is a plausible 
hypothesis that people from lower incomes will be more likely to leave employment once they acquire a 
disability. The relationship between poverty, disability and education is complex, and is an interesting 
avenue for future research.
40
reported a chronic illness or disability for two years and then reported no such illness or 
disability for the next two years, and Table 2.9 shows the employment rate for these 
people in the year before disability “exit”, the year of exit, and the following year. We 
see that 50 per cent were employed when they reported the chronic illness or disability. 
This rose to 58 per cent in the year they stopped reporting such an illness or disability, 
and was slightly lower in the next year. This is quite a substantial increase in the 
employment rate when we consider that we have concentrated on those who had the 
chronic illness or disability for at least two years, and also does not suggest any 
significant lag between exit from that status and the increase in proportion employed, 
though it is of course confined to those who then remain free of disability over the two- 
year period.
Table 2.9 Employment Status for those Exiting Chronic Illness/Disability
Year Before 
Exit
Year of Exit from Chronic 
Illnes s/Dis ability
Year after 
Exit
% % %
Employed 50.0 58.3 56.2
Non-employed 50.0 41.7 43.8
N=72
We then estimate a probit model of the probability of being in work for the entire 
sample of individuals who had a chronic illness or disability for the previous two years. 
The results in Table 2.10 show that those who exit disability are 10 percentage points 
more likely to be in work than those at risk who do not exit. However, when we enter 
additional explanatory variables to control for other factors such as age, gender, and 
having no educational qualifications, the effect of exiting disability was no longer 
significant. Individuals who exited from disability had the same probability of getting 
work as other individuals who were at risk of exit but did not recover from their 
disability. This implies the longer-term effects of disability are also significant in terms 
of future employment.
This increase in the probability of being in employment is smaller than the reduction 
associated with disability onset that we estimated in the previous section. There is no 
reason to expect that one would simply offset the other; apart from anything else, the 
same people do not simply “flow” into and out of disability, since some of those
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experiencing onset do not exit. In addition, even if  the same people were involved it 
could well be that different processes operate in the labour market in terms of 
employment retention on disability onset versus returning to employment on disability 
exit.
Table 2.10 Exit and Probability of Being in Work
E xit fro m  
Chronic  
Illness/D isability  
only
+ persona l  
characteristics
+ household  
characteristics
+education
Exit from 0.1039** 0.0723** 0.0693* 0.0574
chronic
illness/disability
Female -0.0372 -0.0263 -0.0371
Age 25-34 -0.0819** -0.0778** -0.0688**
35-44 -0.1093** -0.1045** -0.0932**
45-54 -0.1871** -0.1991** -0.1611**
55-64 -0.3434** -0.3654** -0.3162**
Two adults -0.0218 -0.0295
Three + adults 0.0282 0.0154
One child -0.0485* -0.0471*
Two+ children 0.0217 0.0214
No education -0.0676**
qualifications
Year -0.0247** -0.0097 -0.0087 -0.0092
Pseudo R2 0.0273 0.1950 0.2276 0.2510
N 488 488 488 488
Note: **p  < 0.05,*/? <0.10
Over the life of the panel survey, 124 individuals of working age reported a chronic 
illness or disability throughout. As we saw earlier, these individuals are more likely than 
those with shorter or no experience of disability to be male, older, and have low 
education levels. Over half of those reporting chronic illness or disability throughout 
were not working in any of the survey waves. This compares with 25% for those who 
reported disability onset during the period, and 18% for those not reporting any chronic 
illness or disability throughout the panel. Differences in the number of years spent 
employed or non-employed could be partly due to other characteristics such as gender, 
age or education, so we now estimate formal statistical models to try to disentangle 
these effects. We take all working-age adults in the sample, and look at the probability 
that they were in employment in a given wave of the panel -  so the number of
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observations is again the total number of adults by the number of waves we observe 
them. In Table 2.11 we estimate the model to look at the effect of persistent disability 
on the probability of being at work. The first point of comparison is with those reporting 
no disability throughout the panel, and these are used as the reference category. 
Secondly, it is also of interest to compare those experiencing persistent disability with 
those who reported disability onset, disability exit, and other durations or trajectories of 
disability over the life of the panel, so these are also included among the variables in the 
estimated model/ Each adult is included in the regression each time they are observed 
in the panel -  so someone reporting onset will be counted first as a person without 
disability and then as a person who has reported onset; their labour force status at each 
of those points in time is what the model seeks to understand. We look first at the 
results when only the variables relating to disability are included, and then at what 
happens to these estimates when other individual and household characteristics are 
added to the model as explanatory factors.
9 This could be, for example, someone reporting disability but for only one year -  since we only count it 
as an “onset” if it lasts at least two years -  or someone reporting disability in six out of the seven years -  
since we only count an “exit” lasting two years or more will be counted in this “other” category in the 
years they are reporting disability, and in the reference category in the other years. Similarly, someone 
reporting chronic illness or disability every second year will fall into this other category when they are 
reporting disability.
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Table 2.11  Persistent Chronic Illness/Disability and Probability of Work
Pr(W orking)
B ase
Personal
Characteristics
H ouseho ld
Circum stances
Education
Chronic
illness/disability for
entire panel -0.4190** -0.4695** -0.4387** -0.4138**
Disability onset -0.2621** -0.2204** -0.2032** -0.1865**
Disability exit -0.1421** -0.1044** -0.0688 -0.0554
Other disability
trajectory -0.1428** -0.1041** -0.0840** -0.0678**
Female -0.3547** -0.3715** -0.3808**
Age 25-34 0.0984** 0.0987** 0.1181**
35-44 0.0586** 0.0789** 0.1052**
44-54 -0.0165 -0.0121 0.0348
55-65 -0.2433** -0.2712** -0.2008**
Adult2 -0.0183 -0.0301
Adult3 -0.0546 -0.0558
Child 1 -0.0013 0.0025
Child2 -0.0573** -0.0523**
Poor in previous year -0.3858** -0.3561**
No education
qualifications -0.1403**
Year 0.0213** 0.0279** 0.0281** 0.0260**
N 15332 15332 15321 15321
R squared 0.0422 0.1780 0.2366 0.2460
Note: **p  < 0.05,*p < 0.10
We see in the first column that persistent disability has a marked impact on the 
probability of being in work, reducing it by 42 percentage points compared with the 
reference category. That category comprises those reporting no disability throughout the 
panel, and for those individuals 70% were in employment in a given wave. This means 
that for those who always reported a disability, the predicted employment rate is only 
28% (that is, 70%-42%). Controlling for age and gender (in column 2) actually 
increases the estimated effect of persistent disability, but when household characteristics 
and the individual’s education levels are included (in columns 3 and 4) that effect falls 
back again to about the level seen without any controls. So the impact of persistent 
disability throughout the panel survey on the likelihood of being in work is very 
substantial indeed.10 (As explained earlier, capturing the severity of persistent disability 
for individuals over the period proved difficult since it proved quite variable from one 
year to the next, so we have not sought to incorporate that into our analysis of 
persistence.)
10 Note that in looking at the impact o f  different disability experiences Gannon and Nolan (2004a) looked 
at the employment rate in 2000 o f  those who had experienced persistent disability (and other durations), 
whereas here we have incorporated employment over the entire period from 1995 to 2001.
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The results also show that those who reported disability onset, disability exit or other 
disability trajectories are less likely to be in employment in a given wave than those 
who reported no disability, but that gap is considerably less than for those persistently 
reporting disability. (The point of reference being used here for these people is not the 
same as in the earlier analysis focused on onset and exit, where the comparison was 
with those “at risk”; we include them here where the reference group is those 
experiencing no disability in order to allow a direct comparison with the impact of 
persistent disability.)
2.7 Conclusions and implications
People with disabilities face many barriers to full participation in the labour market, 
with serious implications for living standards and quality of life. This chapter has 
analysed the factors associated with participation or non-participation in the labour 
market by people reporting chronic illness or disability in Ireland. The results of the 
cross-section analysis show a substantial impact on labour force participation of having 
a long-standing illness that limits the individual severely in their work or daily life. 
Working-age men reporting such a condition had a labour force participation probability 
of 60 percentage points lower than those without a condition, having controlled for 
other characteristics such as age and education, while for women the corresponding 
reduction was over 40%. Since the labour force participation rate for women is much 
lower than men, this means that the predicted participation rate for men and women 
severely limited by a longstanding illness or disability is only 25% and 10% 
respectively on average. For those reporting a longstanding illness which limited them 
to some extent though not severely, there was also a significant though much smaller 
impact on the likelihood of participating in the labour force. For those reporting a 
longstanding illness or disability that did not limit them in their work or daily activities 
there was no statistically significant effect on labour force participation. These results 
are broadly similar to the findings similar studies using the same methods, for example 
in the UK (Madden and Walker, 1999) and in the US (Chirokos and Nestel, 1985 and 
Stem, 1989).
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Research on the topic elsewhere also highlights a number of ways in which 
investigation of this issue could usefully be developed. In particular, methods recently 
applied elsewhere using panel data go beyond what can be achieved with cross-sectional 
analysis. For example, Bardasi, Jenkins and Rigg (2003) using data from the British 
Household Panel Survey find that becoming disabled is indeed associated with a very 
sharp decline in employment there. Panel data from the Living in Ireland Survey 
allowed this dynamic perspective to be adopted in this chapter and we differentiated the 
transitions into and out of a disability state. Analysis of the characteristics associated 
with an increased risk of onset showed that older people are more likely to become ill or 
disabled. Having been in a low-income household in the previous year was also 
associated with an increased probability of disability onset. Among all those “at risk”, 
persons initially in work seemed more likely than others to report exiting disability. 
Those experiencing persistent disability were seen to be disproportionately older and 
poorly educated.
We then examined what happens to employment after an “onset” of disability. Having 
taken a range of personal and household characteristics into account, the onset of 
disability was associated with a decline of about 20 percentage points in the probability 
of being active in the labour force. We then focused on those observed in the panel 
“exiting” chronic illness or disability. Further analysis of these individuals confirmed 
that exiting disability was associated with an increase of about 7 percentage points in 
the probability of being in employment, having controlled for personal and household 
characteristics. Finally, we showed that persistent disability - reporting chronic illness 
or disability throughout the seven years of the panel survey - was associated with a 
greatly reduced likelihood of being in employment. Only 13% of these individuals were 
in employment throughout the period. When a range of personal and household 
characteristics was taken into account, such persistent disability was shown by 
statistical analysis to be associated with a 42 percentage point reduction in the 
likelihood of being in employment.
These findings show that not only persistent disability but also disability onset are 
associated with a very substantial reduction in the likelihood that someone will be in 
employment. This poses a major challenge for policy in relation to tackling the many- 
faceted barriers to obtaining and maintaining employment that face people with
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disabilities. While this chapter aimed to explore various strands of disability duration 
and impacts on labour force participation, we acknowledge the caveat that self-reported 
disability may be endogenous with respect to employment status. Furthermore, if  
reporting of disability in the survey is prone to measurement error, the true effect of 
disability may be inaccurately estimated. In this chapter, disability is treated as 
exogenous and our results therefore provide a foundation on which to build more 
complex dynamic models. We therefore explore each of these issues in this thesis, 
firstly by looking at endogeneity in chapter three.
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Appendix 2
Table A2.1 Variable definitions for Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Definition Men Women
LFP =1 if  participating in the labour market, =0 otherwise 84.0 57.8
Disabled with severe limitation =1 if  disabled and severely limited in daily activities, =0 otherwise 2.8 1.7
Disabled with some limitation =1 i f  disabled and limited to some extent in daily activities, =0 otherwise 8.1 8.3
Disabled with no limitation =1 i f  disabled and not limited in daily activities, =0 otherwise 4.1 4.7
(Base category=No disability) 84.0 85.1
Age 15-24 =1 if  aged 15-24 years, =0 otherwise 24.0 22.4
Age 25-34 =1 i f  aged 25-34 years, =0 otherwise 18.6 17.7
Age 35-44 =1 if  aged 35-44 years, =0 otherwise 20.1 21.2
Age 45-54 =1 i f  aged 45-54 years, =0 otherwise 20.4 21.2
(Base category=aged 55-64 years) 16.6 16.9
BMW =1 if  living in Border, Midlands, W est region, =0 otherwise 
(Base category=Rest o f  Country)
30.8 28.5
Secondary Education =1 i f  highest level o f  education completed is secondary, =0 otherwise 58.5 61.3
Third Level Education =1 if  highest level o f  education completed is third level, =0 otherwise
(Base category=No qualifications or highest level o f  education completed is primary)
18.4 18.9
Married =1 i f  married or living with a partner, =0 otherwise 55.6 59.8
Age Youngest Child<4 =1 if  age o f  youngest child is less than 4, =0 otherwise 10.1 12.2
Age Youngest Child>=4 and <12 =1 if  age o f  youngest child is greater than or equal to 4 and less than 12, =0 otherwise 14.6 16.9
Age Youngest Child>=12and <18 =1 i f  age o f  youngest child is greater than or equal to 12 and less than 18, =0 otherwise 12.1 13.3
Unearned Income =Net Household Income -  N et Individual Disposable Income (Net Individual Disposable 356.49 478.60
Income includes net incomes from work, social welfare payments and child benefit. Net (309.11) (346.91)
Household Income aggregates individual data to household level)_____________
Note: The regional classifications are based on the NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units) classification used by Eurostat.
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Table A2.2 Onset and Exit in Chronic Illness/Disability» 1995-2001
T otal a t risk O nset o f  ch ro n ic  
iilness/ciisability
A t risk  b u t no onse t
N u m b er o f 1,972 166 1,806
Persons
N um ber o f 6 ,997 166 6,831
person-w aves
%  o f  total 100 2.4 97 .6
person -w aves
T o ta l at risk E xit fro m  C h ro n ic A t risk  b u t no exit
Illn ess/D isab ility
N u m b er o f 333 96 237
Persons
N u m b er o f 755 96 659
p erso n -w av es
%  o f  person - 100 13.0 87.0
w aves
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Table A2.3 Interaction effects for education and disability
Men Women
Not disabled (reference)
Disabled with severe/some limitation -0.4654** -0.3231**
(0.0451) (0.0526)
Disabled with no limitation -0.0985 * -0.1359
(0.0620) (0.0914)
Age 55-64 (reference)
15-24 -0.0142 0.1344**
(0.0091) (0.0360)
25-34 0.1129** 0.3633”
(0 .0 1 2 0 ) (0.0238)
35-44 0 .1 0 2 2 *’ 0.3266**
(0.0129) (0.0257)
45-54 0.0876” 0.2621”
(0 .0 1 2 1 ) (0.0254)
Single (reference)
Married 0.0737** -0.0814**
(0.0208) (0.0279)
Unearned Income/100 0 . 0 0 0 2 -0.0066**
(0.0019) (0.0029)
No Qualifications (reference)
Secondary education 0.0469*’ 0.2057*’
(0.0175) (0.0269)
Third level education 0.0820** 0.3836”
(0.0131) (0 .0 2 1 1 )
(Remainder of Country-reference)
Border, Midlands, West Regions 0.0051 -0.0442**
(0.0114) (0.0204)
No children (reference)
Age youngest child <4 0.0375* -0.2049**
(0.0259) (0.0346)
>=4 and <12 0.0103 -0.1116**
(0.0228) (0.0322)
> = 1 2  and <18 0.0359* -0.0379
(0.0177) (0.0319)
Disabled limitation/secondary education 0.0655** 0.0856
(0.0156) (0.0665)
Disabled no limitation/secondary education 0.1023” 0.0979
(0.0082) (0.0945)
Disabled limitation/third level education 0.0572 0.0453
(0.0310) (0.1016)
Disabled no limitation/third level education -0.0334 -0.0682
(0.0839) (0.1707)
McFadden R2 0.2479 0.1440
N observations 3315 3362
Note: * *p < 0.05,*p < 0.10
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Chapter Three
A Dynamic Analysis o f Disability and Labour Force Participation in 
Ireland 1995-2000
3.1 Introduction
In chapter two we presented the base impact of current, previous and persistent 
disability on labour force participation, without controlling for biasing factors such as 
endogeneity or measurement error. Nonetheless, in studying the effect of disability on 
labour force participation, we are faced with a variety of analytical challenges, such as 
the effect of unobserved characteristics of disabled individuals and the effect of their 
past participation in the labour market. This chapter uses panel data methods to 
control for these factors and we estimate the impact of disability on participation, 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and past participation.
The focus of previous policy for disabled people has been on the provision of 
services, whereas more recently, there is a campaign for civil rights and the provision 
of legislation for equality and full participation11. Employers and policy makers are 
therefore interested in whether or not disability has an effect on participation. In 
estimating the effect of disability on labour force participation, there are two main 
sources of bias that may arise, from measurement error and endogeneity. Previous 
research by Bound, (1991) and Lindeboom and Kerfhofs, (2002) has already set out 
the main issues involved and we now review these to emphasise the motivation for 
this paper. Firstly, there may be problems with the measurement of the disability 
variable and lack of comparability across individuals may lead to underestimates of 
the effect of disability (via classical measurement error). On the other hand, economic 
or psychological incentives may affect an individual’s response to questions on 
disability, leading to differential measurement error within the self-reported measure 
of disability in the participation model. Secondly, participation and disability may be 
endogenously related because of direct effects of participation on disability. In 
addition, there may be unobservables that influence both disability and participation
11 The employment policies (Employment Equality A ct 1998 and Equality A ct 2004) in Ireland define 
disability as ‘including total or partial absence of bodily or mental facilities, chronic disease, whether 
manifest or not, learning and personality disorders’. These policies are directed at all individuals with a 
disability, even i f  not registered as disabled.
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outcomes, for example through an individual’s time preference or previous
investments in human or health capital. In this paper, we focus on controlling for the
1 2latter, referred to by Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, (2002) as ‘classical endogeneity’ .
Our data offer the possibility of analysing the relationship between disability and 
labour force participation over a significant period rather than just at a point in time, 
and allow us to use panel data techniques in our estimation. Using panel data, we 
capture the effects of variables that are particular to an individual and are constant 
over time. Labour force participation may also be influenced by past participation, 
where non-participants in the previous year may be less likely to participate in the 
current year. Although this may be true for all individuals, it may also be a specific 
characteristic of disabled people and lead to an incorrect interpretation of the 
disability effect. It may be that disability reduces the probability of previous 
participation, and therefore indirectly influences current participation. Using panel 
data, we can incorporate this state dependence effect and re-estimate the effect of 
disability on participation.
More recently, Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2002) also include the effect of past labour 
market outcomes on current health in their retirement model. They find that for 
elderly people, working in the previous period only slightly decreases the value of 
health. They estimate a multinomial logit model, to facilitate the three different labour 
market states compared to working, available to individuals nearing retirement age in 
the Netherlands. Although they only have two waves of panel data, by using 
information on previous labour market history, they specify an equation for initial 
participation and estimate the probability of working initially. This is included into 
the overall likelihood function from which unobserved effects are integrated out. They 
find that the effects of health are exaggerated for elderly people in a simple 
multinomial model, compared to their preferred model.
12 The issue o f reporting behaviour has been dealt with in the context o f the retirement literature. Bound 
(1991) gives an excellent exposition of the issues involved with reporting behaviour and the resulting 
bias, and concludes that without external information about reporting behaviour it is not possible to 
identify the extent o f the reporting bias. Later studies follow this approach, (e.g. Lindeboom and 
Kerkhofs, (2002) and Kreider, (1999)) and make assumptions regarding systematic reporting behaviour 
to identify the extent o f reporting bias. This paper does not focus on reporting issues.
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The contribution of this paper to the literature on disability and participation is in the 
way the dynamics are estimated and in particular the approach used to deal with initial 
conditions. Bound et al. (1999) analysed the dynamic relationship between health and 
labour force transitions, and examined how the timing of health shocks affects labour 
force behaviour but noted that to credibly control for initial conditions is a difficult 
task. We follow the Wooldridge (2002) approach to control for unobserved effects 
that may be correlated with disability and we discuss this further in section 3.3. This is 
different to the approach to Lindeboom and Kerfhofs (2002) mainly because we use 
six waves of panel data and can therefore identify the effect of past participation 
within a less complicated model. The main focus in this paper is to model two labour 
market outcomes -  participation and non-participation -  and hence we concentrate on 
a binary response variable. In contrast to Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2002) and Bound 
et al. (1999) we follow an approach by Wooldridge (2002) that allows us to avoid 
specifying a distribution for the initial participation. The likelihood function from our 
approach is easier to estimate and serves the same purpose in terms of looking at the 
effect of unobserved heterogeneity. Our findings using Irish data are similar to 
previous international research; reported disability status overestimates the effect of 
disability on participation. In addition, we show exactly how much unobserved 
heterogeneity contributes to variation in participation and how this changes the effect 
of disability. Finally, we show the effect o f past disability (via it’s effect on previous 
participation), on current labour force participation.
3.2 Data
The data on disability and labour force participation in Ireland are from the Living in 
Ireland Survey 1995-2000. Within the sample there is considerable attrition over the 
period with 7,254 individuals responding in 1995 and only 3,670 of these still present 
by 2000. We present the composition of the sample at each wave in Table 3.1 and 
return to the potential effects of this attrition in section 3.4. We wish to focus on 
individuals of working age, hence we exclude those aged 65 and over.
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Table 3.1 Sample Size and Composition at each Wave
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
Men 50.4 50.5 50.4 49.8 49.9 49.1
Women 49.6 49.5 49.6 50.2 50.1 50.9
Age 15-24 24.9 24.7 24.2 23.7 2 2 . 8 23.1
24-34 20.5 2 0 . 2 20.3 20.5 2 0 . 0 18.7
35-44 2 0 . 6 20.7 2 1 . 1 20.9 21.4 21.3
45-54 19.1 19.4 19.3 19.7 19.8 19.5
55-65 14.8 14.9 15.0 15.2 15.9 17.4
Education
Primary 26.9 26.3 26.2 24.6 23.8 2 1 . 8
Secondary 59.8 60.7 60.7 58.7 58.3 60.7
Third Level 13.2 13.1 13.1 16.6 17.9 17.6
Married 59.1 58.7 59.2 58.5 58.6 56.9
N 7254 6337 5782 5273 4482 3670
In the Living in Ireland Survey, detailed information on current labour force status 
was obtained. For current purposes this allows us to distinguish between those who 
were at work, or unemployed but seeking work -  who we will count as active in the 
labour force -  and all others, whom we will count as inactive. The percentage of those 
unemployed but seeking work is quite low ranging from 7.5% in 1995 to 2.8% in 
2000, giving a panel average of 5.1%. For this reason, we do not include them as a 
separate category in our dependent variable. Only 2.2% of the panel is retired before 
the age of 65, with more men than women taking early retirement. For those who had 
a disability in the previous year, 1 % changes from employment to retirement in the 
current year, and only 0.5% go from non-participation into retirement. Of all those 
currently with a disability, 2% of men leave employment for retirement and 4% 
become retired following a spell of non-participation. While it would be interesting to 
analyse the effect of disability on early retirement, again the sample size does not 
allow such investigation. A more detailed survey of disability and retirement of older 
workers in Ireland would provide better data for this purpose.
As in chapter two, the measure of disability is based on individual responses to the 
following question:
“Do you have any chronic, physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?”
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We should note that employers in Ireland as in many other industrialised countries are 
obliged by law to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ for those affected by disability. 
This may be achieved by changes in the work environment or in the way a job is 
performed to enable a person with a disability to fully do a job and enjoy equal 
employment opportunities. For this reason, in the survey a person may respond as not 
limited in daily activities, but without adaptation it is possible that they should be 
classified as severely limited. The extent to which respondents say they are limited 
relates to their daily activities rather than work, but similar measures have been shown 
to have significant discriminatory power in terms of labour force participation in 
research elsewhere (e.g. Malo and Garcia-Serrano, 2003). Furthermore, as Table 3.2 
shows there are different rates of participation for each sub-group, so it is important 
that we distinguish between the different levels of disability, in our analysis of labour 
force participation.
Table 3.2 Labour Force Status by level o f limitation
Severe
limitation
Some
limitation
No limitation No chronic 
illness or 
disability
Men
Participation 34.92 58.02 81.45 91.59
Non-participation 65.08 41.98 18.55 8.41
N 189 655 318 6026
Women
Participation 13.82 31.82 44.65 55.15
Non-participation 86.18 68.18 55.35 44.85
N 123 707 318 6522
The effects of disability on labour force participation may differ among individuals, 
depending on other characteristics, for example age or education. Since disability may 
be correlated with other variables, we include measures of age, education, region, 
unearned income, age of youngest child and marital status. These variables are 
defined in detail in chapter two and summary statistics are provided in Table A2.1. 
The youngest individuals in this sample are aged 16 and the number of observations 
of males and females are 7,188 and 7,670 respectively.
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3.3 Model
A general model of labour force participation and disability may be constructed as 
follows:
y a =K + b\y„-i +  h2 Du + biDu-\ + h4zu + ai +  eu [3 ■ i ]
where y it is the observed indicator of labour force participation, y*t is the underlying 
construct generating y u and z it represents a range of other variables. We also include 
lagged values of disability into our model, ( D u_x ) and this allows us to distinguish the 
effects on participation of those who have a longer-term disability from those who 
have just acquired their disability. The individual time invariant unobserved effect is 
captured by a,.. In order to distinguish between the two effects -  unobserved 
individual effects and past participation - we include a lagged dependent variable into 
the model.
The empirical model is motivated by a lifecycle model where the choice between 
consumption and leisure is considered as a lifetime decision, and we assume that 
individuals maximise their expected utility over their lifetime (following Bound et al. 
(1999)). Our main aim to concentrate on how the disability effect changes once we 
allow for unobserved individual effects and state dependence in labour force 
participation. For individuals who have different expectations about future disability 
depending on the duration of their disability, those with previous disability that is 
expected to persist are less likely to participate in the future. Since disability may be 
expected to reduce wages and increase disutility of work we would expect current 
disability to be negatively related to current participation. The effect is reinforced if 
disability increases access to unearned income13. We are also interested in the effects 
of lagged disability conditional on current disability. People who are persistently with 
a disability may be less likely to recover; therefore, we might expect differences in the 
behaviour of two individuals both of whom are disabled today if their previous
13 Our specification includes a measure o f unearned income but does not include a control for wages. 
Correctly accounting for the relationship between disability and wages is a topic for future research.
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disability status was different. Lagged effects may also be significant if  transition 
takes time or if there is state dependence in unemployment. In this case we might 
expect to see different behaviour across two individuals neither of whom are disabled 
today if past disability had caused one of them to leave the labour force in the past. 
We test this in our paper by explicitly modelling state-dependence in labour force 
participation and observing the resulting effect on lagged disability.
To provide some baseline estimates of disability we firstly estimate a static pooled 
model assuming that the errors are independent over time and uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables. This model assumes that disability is exogenous (we relax this 
assumption later on) and provides us with base estimates, with which we can compare 
results from models that incorporate unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. 
For notational purposes, we let xa include disability, lagged disability and other 
variables, for the remainder of the chapter. The log likelihood function for the pooled 
panel data is similar to that of the cross sectional probit:
l o g l ( P ) = y * I > , , l o g ^ ( X / ? ) + Z  t3 -2]
1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1
and maximising this across all i with respect to (3, we obtain the pooled probit 
estimator. The standard errors have been adjusted to account for clustering at the level 
of the individual.
While this model provides us with base estimates of disability, it does not allow us to 
answer two important questions. The first interesting question is whether or not the 
control variables appropriately account for any unobserved characteristics of disabled 
people that also influence their labour force participation decision? If this were not 
true, we would expect that the actual effect of current disability should be lower.
The second question is whether or not past disability affects current participation 
directly, or does it work through a separate channel by negatively affecting past 
participation? If so, we would expect to see that past participation influences current 
participation, and the effect of past disability should disappear. This would suggest
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that past disability still does have an effect on current participation, but does so by a) 
directly influencing past participation and therefore, b) indirectly affecting current 
participation.
To allow for these effects we estimate a dynamic model of participation that 
incorporates both past participation and unobserved effects. In general terms the 
following likelihood is derived and maximised;
/O'/o.-.y/T- \x i0, - , x ir ,P)=  f  / ( y i0,-,y ,T  l*,-i,...xiT,a i ,P ) f ( a i | x ^ d a ,J-CO
[3.3]
T
= \ y u - \ ,x it, a i ,P )] f{ym \x i0,a i,P ) f { a i \x i )dal
/=i
In a dynamic model, we observe individuals at some time after the start of the process, 
and most likely the initial state is not randomly assigned to the individual. If the initial 
state and unobserved effect are correlated we need to specify / (yw | xj, a i ) - known as 
the initial conditions problem. Heckman (1981) suggests approximating 
/ (y/o I xi’a i) and then specifying f (a , \ x , ) .  Then f { y m,...,yiT \x,) is obtained by 
integrating out the unobserved effect. The main difficulty in this approach is in 
specifying the distribution of initial participation. We therefore follow an alternative 
approach suggested by Wooldridge (2002) where we consider:
f ( y n > - , y i T \ y i o > x i ) =  f  /O v - . jw  Iy i 0 > x i >«,)/(«/1y i 0 ^ x i ) d a i  t3-4JJ-co
To control for correlated unobserved heterogeneity we follow Mundlak (1978) and 
Wooldridge (2002) and specify the distribution of the unobserved effect conditional 
on the initial value y  ¡a and the time-averages of any potentially endogenous variables:
a ,  = a 0 + a [ y . 0 + a ' 2x , + a i . [3.5]
The estimate of ai is of interest as it shows the direction of the relationship between 
the unobserved effect and the initial value of labour force participation. The relative 
importance of the unobserved effect in the error variance of the labour force
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participation equation is measured as p  — <J2a /(I +  (J2a ) . This is also the correlation 
between the composite latent error ( a i + s it ) across any two time periods.
The likelihood function is now:
f j n . / ^  I «,•>/?)]/(«, I y ¡Qix if P)d-a i [3.6]
/=i
where f { a  | y ,0 , x u, p )  =  0 ( a ,y i0 +  a 2 x . , cr2n ) ify it= 1 .
In this model of labour force participation, the individual effects are assumed to be 
random draws from a population, but correlated with the explanatory variables. We 
estimate a dynamic random effects probit model and maximise this likelihood 
function with respect to /? and <j2a . This model assumes that the errors can now be 
correlated over time through the unobserved effect. The explanatory variables are 
assumed to be strictly exogenous and are uncorrelated with the error term, eu, for 
each individual. The advantage of using this model over the pooled static model is 
that we can now estimate parameters with greater efficiency. While the pooled model 
would allow us to obtain consistent estimates of these parameters, it is inefficient 
relative to our full conditional maximum likelihood model. Furthermore, the pooled 
model does not allow for correlation between the unobserved effect and explanatory 
variables.
The means of variables are added as a set of controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
and we are now estimating the effects of changing explanatory variables but holding 
the average fixed. However, we should note that in this model, it is only possible to 
identify the effect of time-constant explanatory variables if we assume that the 
unobserved effect is partially uncorrelated with the time constant variable, where the 
coefficient for the correlated random effect part of that variable is zero.
In the pooled probit model we obtained estimates of ¡3 / <Jn and because the total error
variance was normalised to 1 , the estimated [3s were population-averaged parameters 
by default. However, the random effects model parameter estimates will only be the
same as those from the pooled model when <J2a = 0 . Therefore we need to rescale the
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[Is that are estimated from the model. This is achieved by dividing the parameter 
estimates from the random effects model by x/(l + cxj ).
The dynamic random effects probit model relies on the assumption of strict 
exogeneity of the explanatory variables (x/) conditional on a, :
P(yit = Mxi ,y u_x,...,yiQ,a i) = P(yit = l \x u,y u_l,a i) . [3.7]
This means, that conditional on participation in the previous year and conditional on 
the unobserved individual effect, participation in the current year should not be related 
to any explanatory variable in past or future years. However, in our dynamic model, 
misspecification may arise from feedback effects from current labour force 
participation to future disability. We tested for exogeneity of the three limitation 
variables, by including future values of disability into the pooled probit model, 
(following Wooldridge (2002)). If the current disability variables are strictly 
exogenous, we should find the future values to be insignificant. We found that severe 
and some limitations are significant, meaning that these two variables are subject to 
feedback effects in the model for men. In that case, we should not rely on the results 
of the dynamic random effects model, as the assumption of strict exogeneity has been 
violated. Using a pooled dynamic probit model we can obtain consistent (yet 
inefficient) estimates and in that sense is more reliable than the random effects model, 
(Biewen, 2004). The pooled probit model with time averages only requires 
contemporaneous exogeneity, i.e. it only restricts the relationship between the 
disturbance and explanatory variables in the same time period. The pooled probit 
model does not rely on the strict exogeneity assumption, and so allows us to estimate 
a dynamic model of participation controlling for correlated heterogeneity, providing 
consistent but inefficient estimates (Biewen, 2004).
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3.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics
Chapter two contained a detailed description of disability dynamics. Table 3.3 
provides a brief summary of year to year transitions. Firstly, we note that of those who 
have a disability at any year, 73% remain so in the following year. This means that 
approximately one quarter of all individuals recover from their disability, and so it is 
of interest to see if there is a lagged effect of disability on their current labour force 
participation. Similarly, the participation of those who do not recover is of interest. 
Furthermore, 6 % of all men and women have a new disability each year, and again we 
would like to observe if this affects their current participation status. Within the group 
that do not recover there are also changes in the severity of their disability, so in our 
model we focus on the three categories of severe, some and no restrictions in daily 
activities.
Table 3.3 Transitions in Disability Status
No Disability t Disability t
% %
No Disability t-1 94.0 6 . 0
Disability t-1 27.2 72.8
Static Pooled Probit Model:
Using the Living in Ireland Survey 1995-2000, we estimate a range of panel models to 
capture the effect of disability on participation. The main variables of interest are, 
disability and the associated limitations in daily activities, but we also control for 
other factors that may be correlated with disability, as mentioned earlier. In addition, 
it is likely that past disability has a direct effect on current participation, so we include 
lagged variables for the three types of disability. Pooling all available data for the 
years 1995 to 2000, and estimating a standard probit model, we obtain estimates from 
the pooled balanced sample14. We present results from this pooled static model in 
Table 3.4, Columns 1 and 4, for men and women respectively. These results are
14 We tested for non-random attrition using the procedure suggested by Wooldridge, (2002). The results 
find no evidence to suggest that our reported results are affected by non-random attrition.
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presented as parameter coefficients, but we will later discuss some of the main results 
in terms of percentage effects.
The effects of current disability are quite high for both men and women, reducing the 
probability of current labour force participation significantly. At a first glance, 
disability has a greater negative effect on the labour force participation probability of 
men, compared to women. Although the effect of a severely limiting disability is less 
for women than men, it is still substantial. In the case of men, even those with no 
limitations have a slight reduction in the probability of participation. For women, we 
see that the probability of participation for those with no limitations, is not 
significantly different from women with no disability. The gap between the effects of 
severe and some limitations is quite large for men and even more pronounced for 
women, suggesting that severe disability has a more negative effect on women’s 
participation. Past disability, in the previous year, also has a substantial effect on 
current participation, and is not much lower than the effect of current disability. The 
equality of current and past disability is also implicit in the results presented by Au et 
al. (2004) in Table 10. This applies in the case of severe and some limitations, for 
both men and women. Similar to current disability and severe limitations, we see that 
individuals who previously had a severely limiting disability have a much lower 
probability of current participation, compared to those with no previous disability.
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Table 3.4 Panel Model Results
Men
(coefficients)
Women
(coefficients)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Pooled
Static
Random
effects
dynamic
(re-scaled)
Pooled
Dynamic
Pooled
Static
Random
effects
dynamic
(re-scaled)
Pooled
Dynamic
Lag L F P 0.7511**
(0.1194)
1.687**
(0.0918)
0.7494**
(0.0835)
1.7974**
(0.0623)
Disabled with 
severe 
limitation 
Disabled with 
some limitation 
Disabled with 
no limitation
-1.2368**
(0.1314)
-0.7886**
(0.0814)
-0.2066**
(0.1042)
-0.6639**
(0.2653)
-0.5159**
(0.1594)
-0.3464**
(0.2161)
-0.5653**
(0.2218)
-0.4757**
(0.1285)
-0.3397**
(0.1380)
-0.9173**
(0.1736)
-0.3296**
(0.0755)
-0.0175
(0.0928)
-0.8256**
(0.2827)
-0.3137**
(0.1283)
-0.1811**
(0.1497)
-1.1359**
(0.2393)
-0.4210**
(0.1106)
-0.2732**
(0.1326)
L a g g ed  
D isab ility  
Disabled with 
severe 
limitation 
Disabled with 
some limitation 
Disabled with 
no limitation
-1.0555**
(0.1275)
-0.5802**
(0.0783)
-0.0925
(0.1175)
-0.2534
(0.2593)
0.0259
(0.1592)
0.0887
(0.2254)
-0.0765
(0.2465)
0.1796
(0.1302)
0.1298
(0.1461)
-0.6203**
(0.1626)
-0.2742**
(0.0714)
-0.0290
(0.0962)
-0.1470
(0.2863)
-0.0056
(0.1303)
-0.0495
(0.1566)
0.0102
(0.2643)
0.0514
(0.1177)
-0.0464
(0.1363)
In itia l condition  
L F P  in 1995
R andom  effect 
(tim e averages)
1.2059**
(0.2096)
0.6399**
(0.0944)
0.8984**
(0.1353)
0.6315**
(0.0626)
Disabled with 
severe 
limitation 
Disabled with 
some limitation 
Disabled with 
no limitation
-0.8815**
(0.5948)
-0.7265**
(0.3237)
0.3616
(0.5068)
-0.9013**
(0.4588)
-0.7146**
(0.2371)
0.2146
(0.3297)
-0.3077
(0.7211)
-0.1387
(0.2744)
0.4464*
(0.3844)
-0.2653
(0.5607)
-0.1209
(0.2041)
0.5171*
(0.3087)
Constant
N
Pseudo R 2 
Rho
0.4642**
(0.1332)
5930
0.2772
-0.8210**
(0.2167)
5930
0.4684**
-1.0449**
(0.1332)
5930
0.5371
-0.5446**
(0.1074)
6330
0.1700
-0.1118**
(0.1595)
6330
0.3984**
-1.5214**
(0.0945)
6330
0.5303
N ote: * *p  <  0.05,*p <  0.10. (S ign ificance  in random  effec ts m odels  a re  b a sed  on t-s ta ts  on base  
coefficients, no t on  the re sca led  coe ffic ien ts  rep o r ted  in th is table). E stim a tio n  w as ca rr ied  o u t using  
the x tp ro b it co m m a n d  in S ta ta  V ersion  7.0
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In terms of the other explanatory variables (see Table A3.1), we see that labour force 
participation increases with age up to 34 (compared to those aged 55-64), but the 
effect falls slightly after the age of 44. Those with secondary or third level education 
have a greater probability of participating in the labour market. As expected, we see 
that women with children are less likely to participate, and this effect gets smaller as 
the youngest child is older. The opposite effect is found for men, where children 
increase the probability of participation, in particular when the youngest child is either 
aged less than 4, or in the older age group of 12-18.
Dynamic Model
The results from the dynamic random effects probit model with correlated 
heterogeneity are presented in Table 3.4, columns 2 and 5 for men and women 
respectively. We discuss these results in three steps, (1) state dependence, (2) the 
effect of current and lagged disability and (3) unobserved heterogeneity.
The coefficient on lagged participation is viewed as an indicator of state dependence, 
and suggests that previous participation has a significant positive effect on current 
participation, for both men and women. This suggests, that even after controlling for 
observed and unobserved differences among individuals, participation in the previous 
year is associated with a higher probability of participation in the current year. This 
effect is similar for men and women.
Current disability with severe and some limitations now has a lower effect on current 
participation, and this difference is more pronounced for men. Previous disability is 
now insignificant for men and women. By including past participation into the model, 
the effect of previous disability appears to have no effect on current participation. 
This suggests that previous disability may have influenced previous participation, and 
now influences current participation via the channel of past participation. This does 
not imply, that past disability has no effect on current participation - it simply 
suggests that its effect is now operating through the channel of past participation. In 
this respect our findings are similar to those reported in Bound et al. (1999). In their 
paper lagged health was not an important determinant of labour force exits. However 
it is important to realise that the sample used in Bound et al. (1999) was restricted to
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those individuals who were working at time t- 1 , which is equivalent to conditioning 
on past participation. Our results make this conditioning explicit.
Disney et al. (2004) tested whether participation responses to health shocks were 
symmetric and found that health improvements have a weaker effect on transitions 
from inactivity than the reverse. One could test for these asymmetries in our model by 
including an interaction term between current and lagged disability. However, given 
the 3-fold specification of disability adopted in this paper, a full set of interactions 
would be intractable. This is an issue that we hope to return to in future work.
The results from this dynamic model, suggest that unobserved characteristics may 
have been part of the effect of current disability in the pooled model for men. Indeed, 
if we look at the correlated part of the random effect (time averages), this would 
suggest that having severe or some limitations is associated with unobserved 
characteristics that reduce the probability of participation for men, i.e. part of the 
original current disability effect is due to unobserved characteristics. For women, the 
disability results of the random effects model are generally the same as in the static 
pooled model. The extent of unobserved effects is higher in the model for men, with 
47 per cent of the total variance due to unobserved heterogeneity. The corresponding 
result for women is 40 per cent.
Two different patterns emerge for men and women when we use the pooled estimator 
of the dynamic model. The results of the dynamic pooled probit model are presented 
in columns 3 and 6  of Table 3.4. Firstly, for men the effects of all variables are 
generally the same, compared to the random effects model, with the exception of 
lagged and initial participation. Previous participation has a higher effect, and initial 
participation has a lower effect. This could indicate that the random effects estimate 
of state dependence may be biased due to a violation of the no-feedback assumption. 
For women, the effects of current disability are now higher compared to those in the 
random effects model. The effect of young children has increased slightly. The 
estimate on lagged disability has increased, and the effect of initial participation is 
now lower.
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We note that although the random effects model for women may be preferable, we 
would still expect reasonably similar results from the pooled dynamic model. This is 
not the case, as the pooled model provides more negative estimates of disability. To 
explore this further, we again followed Wooldridge (2002) and tested for the 
exogeneity of two variables -  age of youngest child and education. Third level 
education failed the strict exogeneity test, and it is possible that there is some 
interaction between disability and education for women. Since the disabled may have 
a lower incentive to invest in education, the effects of disability on participation are 
small once the endogeneity of education is taken into account, (Walker and 
Thompson, 1996).
Average partial effects:
So far, we have presented the results as parameter estimates, but it is also interesting 
to present some of the results as percentage effects. So we now estimate some average
partial effects, using the population-averaged parameters J3a = p  / + ) . This
allows us to get partial effects, that are averaged over the population distribution of 
the unobserved effect and we can then compare these to the partial effects of the 
pooled model. The probability of participation is
N N
<5(v>„ +xitp a +xii a) = N~'Y,  $[(V/ + *,v/? + *;‘i)-(l + <Tfl2)-1/2] and for a discrete
1=1 i=1
variable we evaluate this expression at different values for xit, i.e. 0  and 1 , and form 
the difference to obtain the average partial effect. The average partial effect for a 
continuous variable xj is obtained by using the average across i of
+X°Pa +X,ia).
Our main variables of interest are current and lagged disability, but the parameter 
estimates for lagged disability in the dynamic models are insignificant. For this 
reason, we only discuss the average partial effects calculated for current disability and 
lagged participation. In Table 3.5, columns 1 and 4, we see that the average partial 
effect of current disability is similar for men and women in the pooled static model. 
Once we introduce unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence into the model, 
this effect is much lower for men. In the pooled dynamic model, disabled men who 
are severely limited in daily activities are approximately 8  percentage points less
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likely to participate compared to those with no disability. Although this effect is quite 
small, we also see that men who did not participate in the previous year have a lower 
probability of current participation by 40 percentage points. The parameter estimates 
of lagged disability were insignificant in this model, suggesting that part of the non­
participation in the previous period is due to the effect of previous disability15.
The results for women are quite different, in that when we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependence, the effect of current disability is now slightly 
higher in the pooled dynamic model, compared to the pooled static model. However, 
the preferred dynamic model for women may be the random effects model, given that 
we did not reject strict exogeneity of the disability variables. Therefore, the results 
suggest that women who are currently severely limited have a lower probability of 
current participation by 25 percentage points. The effects of some and no limitations 
are much lower. Similar to the case of men, when we compared the static and 
dynamic models, we saw earlier that the effect of lagged disability is no longer 
significant. In Table 3.5, we show that the average partial effect of lagged 
participation is 13 percentage points - this is the magnitude of state dependence.
Table 3.5 Average Partial Effects
[1]
Men
m [31 [4]
Women
[5] [61
Pooled Random effects Pooled Pooled Random effects Pooled
Static dynamic Dynamic Static dynamic Dynamic
(rescaled) (rescaled)
Disabled with -0.3346** -0.1111** -0.0865** -0.3377** -0.2557** -0.3979**
severe (0.0504) (0.0471) (0.0502) (0.0598)
limitation
Disabled with -0.1680** -0.0746** -0.0654** -0.1308** -0.0787** -0.1666**
some limitation (0.0238) (0.0230) (0.0295) (0.0428)
Disabled with -0.0330** -0.0461** -0.0438** -0.0069 -0.0435** -0.1086**
no limitation (0.0187) (0.0221) (0.0369) (0.0524)
Lag  L F P 0.1292** 0.3927** 0.1296** 0.6286**
N o te :*  * p  <  0 . 0 5 , * p  < 0 . 1 0  (S ign ificance  in random  effec ts m odels  a re  b a se d  on t-sta ts  on base  
coefficients, no t on the resca led  co e ffic ien ts  reported  in th is table).
15 It is important to realise that the insignificance o f the lagged disability effect arises from the 
modelling of participation dynamics and not unobserved heterogeneity. Lagged disability remains 
significant in random effects models that do not model labour force dynamics.
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Within the context of similar research using data from other countries, the 
contribution of unobserved effects to the base disability effect is quite similar in this 
paper. Using data for the UK, Kidd et al. (2000) show that 50 per cent of the 
difference in participation rates between disabled and non-disabled men is due to 
unexplained effects. Likewise, Kreider (1999) uses US data and finds that the estimate 
of disability for men is overestimated by 17.2%. Lindeboom and Kerkofs (2002) use 
data from the Netherlands and show that the effect of bad health on the probability of 
receiving disability benefit is overestimated, but the effect on the probability of 
receiving unemployment benefit is underestimated. The coefficients for the base 
models are —4.179 and -0.826, and for the corrected models are -2.261 and -2.131 
respectively. Compared to all of these findings, our parameter estimates for currently 
disabled men with severe or some limitations, suggest that approximately 40-50% of 
the base effect is due to unobserved individual effects/state dependence. For women, 
we find that the original estimates of severe and some limitations are overestimated by 
about 5-10%.
In terms of policy, the results from this paper show that unobserved effects are an 
important factor in the participation decision for disabled people. In this paper, we 
cannot determine the nature of these unobserved characteristics, but further 
knowledge on these effects are necessary for integration of disabled people into the 
labour force. We find that past participation is also an important factor in the 
participation decision for disabled people, and the effect of past disability on past 
participation is relevant in this context16. The results highlight the difference in effects 
between longer term and short-term disability. The effect of past disability may have a 
continued effect through state dependence in labour force participation, even after 
recovery from the disability. Therefore, the focus of disability policy should be on 
early targeting of disabled individuals into employment. Additional information on 
how participation affects future disability will also prove useful, in that we may be
16 The overall result in this paper is the same as in Bound e t al. (1999) -  people with lagged disabilities 
have the same participation rate as those without previous disabilities. In the retirement literature, Au et 
al. (2004) find that past disability decreases the probability o f participation, but they do not control for 
state dependence. An additional finding in our paper is that the effect on participation is influenced by 
previous disability via previous participation.
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able to establish how past occupational injuries from past participation affect current 
disability and participation, and people with these disabilities may re-join the labour 
force. The incentive effects of disability benefits may also play a role here and these 
factors will be investigated in future research.
3.5 Conclusions
People with disabilities face many barriers to full participation in the labour market, 
with serious implications for living standards and quality of life. This paper has 
analysed the factors associated with participation or non-participation in the labour 
market, using data on people reporting chronic illness or disability in a large-scale 
Irish representative survey. The results of the panel analysis presented in this paper, 
bring out the scale of the impact on labour force participation, of having an illness or 
disability that limits the individual severely in their daily life.
We controlled for state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by estimating a 
dynamic model with correlated random effects. The results show that unobserved 
heterogeneity contributes substantially to the base effect of disability for men, and to 
some extent for women. In our preferred model, (pooled dynamic) disabled men with 
a current severe limitation are now only 9 percentage points less likely to participate 
compared to non-disabled men. However, the effect of past participation is quite high, 
at 40 percentage points. For women, our preferred model is the dynamic model with 
correlated random effects. Those with a severely limiting disability have a lower 
probability of participation by 26 percentage points, compared to women with no 
disability. The effects of some and no limitations are less substantial. The effect of 
past participation is lower in the model for women, reducing current participation by 
13 percentage points. The interaction of disability, education and participation of 
women, should be explored further.
In this chapter, we aimed to provide more accurate estimates of the effect of disability 
on participation. However, we acknowledge some limitations. In particular, if the 
reporting of disability in the survey is prone to measurement error, we cannot estimate 
the true effect of disability on participation. This may help to explain the substantial 
contribution of unobserved individual effects, but without extending the model to
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allow for measurement error in reporting behaviour, our results on the effect of 
disability on participation are not conclusive. We consider the issue of measurement 
error in chapter four.
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Appendix 3
Table A3.1 Panel model results - other explanatory variables
Men (coefficients) Women (coefficients)
[1] [21 [3] [4] [5] [6]
Pooled Random effects Pooled Pooled Random effects Pooled
Static dynamic (re-scaled) Dynamic dynamic (re-scaled) Dynamic
Age 15-24 0.0881** -0.8044* -0.5994 0.9325** -0.1242 0.0592
(0.1631) (0.6526) (0.4252) (0.1408) (0.3934) (0.3009)
25-34 0.9489** -0.2594 -0.2330 1.2672** -0.0685 -0.0317
(0.1594) (0.5269) (0.3671) (0.1118) (0.3048) (0.2232)
35-44 0.9263** -0.2174 -0.2452 1.2020** -0.0020 0.0226
(0.1431) (0.3834) (0.2523) (0.1078) (0.2496) (0.1789)
45-54 0.5843** 0.0922 0.0223 0.7312** 0.0905 0.0609
(0.1066) (0.2447) (0.1685) (0.0935) (0.1784) (0.1269)
Secondary 0.3396** -0.0350 -0.0513 0.4454** -0.0354 -0.0590
Education (0.0941) (0.1923) (0.1365) (0.0687) (0.1422) (0.0902)
Third level 0.4645** 0.6479** 0.5838** 1.2310** 0.2164* 0.2114
Education (0.1275) (0.2693) (0.2174) (0.1041) (0.2059) (0.1574)
Married 0.2918** 0.6706 0.5780 -0.3147** -0.3427** -0.3765**
(0.1309) (0.6458) (0.4449) (0.0894) (0.2915) (0.1842)
Age youngest 0.3949** 0.2806 0.2240 -0.6454** -0.6096** -0.7032**
child <4 (0.1913) (0.4664) (0.2715) (0.1051) (0.2177) (0.1754)
>=4 and <12 0.1202 0.2101 0.0871 -0.3852** -0.3356** -0.3934**
(0.1435) (0.3776) (0.2241) (0.0917) (0.1987) (0.1563)
>=12 and <18 0.3626** 0.2887 0.1881 -0.1006 -0.2261** -0.2767**
(0.1177) (0.2512) (0.1491) (0.0885) (0.1566) (0.1227)
Unearned -0.0021 0.0077 -0.0043 -0.0228** 0.0026 -0.0031
Income/100 (0.0142) (0.0274) (0.0244) (0.0092) (0.0145) (0.0106)
BM W 0.1935** 0.1534 0.1836* -0.0942 -0.0253 -0.0200
(0.0846) (0.1787) (0.1026) (0.0664) (0.1222) (0.1067)
R andom  effect
(tim e averages)
Age 15-24 1.1475** 0.8998* 0.9388** 0.8116**
(0.7107) (0.4639) (0.4491) (0.3238)
25-34 0.8831** 0.8192** 0.7351** 0.7433**
(0.5869) (0.4005) (0.3594) (0.2513)
35-44 0.9544** 0.9506** 0.8458** 0.8774**
(0.4605) (0.2951) (0.3078) (0.2084)
45-54 0.3444 0.3871* 0.4373** 0.5064**
(0.3034) (0.2013) (0.2386) (0.1579)
Married -0.6698 -0.5980 0.1869 0.1999
(0.6708) (0.4587) (0.3168) (0.2058)
Secondary 0.4802** 0.4405** 0.2498** 0.2794**
Education (0.2467) (0.1637) (0.1731) (0.1113)
Third level -0.3652 -0.3497 0.3795** 0.4228**
Education (0.3198) (0.2347) (0.2567) (0.1877)
Age youngest 0.2600 0.2245 0.1913 0.2489
child <4 (0.5784) (0.3555) (0.2803) (0.2116)
>=4 and -0.1027 -0.0108 0.2234 0.2855
<12 (0.4472) (0.2590) (0.2405) (0.1802)
>=12 and 0.1202 0.1151 0.2012 0.2574*
<18 (0.3339) (0.2052) (0.2158) (0.1555)
Unearned -0.0137 -0.0018 -0.0310** -0.0248*
Income/100 (0.0393) (0.0311) (0.0225) (0.0146)
BM W 0.1183 0.0743 -0.0233 -0.0291
(0.2250) (0.1343) (0.1552) (0.1166)
N o t e : * * p  <  0.05, * p  <0.10 (Significance in random effects models are based on t-stats on base coefficients, not on
the rescaled coefficients reported in this table). Estimation was carried out using the xtprobit command in Stata Version 7.0.
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Chapter Four
The Influence o f Economic Incentives on Reported Disability Status
4.1 Introduction
Self-reported disability status is often relied upon in labour force participation models, 
but this may be reported with error for economic or psychological reasons and can 
lead to a bias in the effect of disability on participation. The fact that some individuals 
may be prone to mis-reporting their disability or health status is well documented and 
the main types of measurement error involved in estimating the effect of disability on 
labour force participation are sufficiently described in previous literature (Bound, 
1991, Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2000). In summary, firstly there may be problems 
with the measurement of the disability variable and lack of comparability across 
individuals may lead to underestimates of the effect of disability (via classical 
measurement error). Secondly, economic or psychological incentives may affect an 
individual’s response to questions on disability, leading to systematic reporting errors 
by different groups of individuals within the self-reported measure of disability, i.e. 
differential measurement error. In addition to measurement error, there may be 
unobservables that influence both disability and participation outcomes. In this 
chapter, we focus on estimating the extent of differential measurement error (by 
labour force state) in reported limitations in daily activities .
Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) proposed a model of health reporting, applied to 
assessing the extent of state dependent reporting error in subjective health in the 
Netherlands. The purpose of their model was to compare subjective and objective 
measures of disability across labour force states. The model conditioned on an 
objective measure of disability and other explanatory variables for example age or 
education, so that labour force status did not have any additional effect on the latent 
true disability variable. In this chapter, we follow this model by comparing subjective 
and objective measures of disability and then determine if any differences remain 
across labour market states, using the employed group as the reference category. If
17 Chapter three deals with estimating the effect o f disability on participation in the presence of 
classical endogeneity. This acknowledged that i f  the reporting o f disability in the survey is prone to 
measurement error, then we cannot estimate the true impact of disability on participation. Therefore the 
objective of this chapter is to estimate the extent o f measurement error and to assess the influence o f 
economic incentives on state dependent reporting behaviour.
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there are any remaining differences in reported disability between labour force 
groups, this is evidence of state dependent reporting errors relative to the employed. 
Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) concluded that state dependent reporting behaviour 
is an indicator of financial incentives to mis-report. In their later paper however 
(Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002), they noted that the extent of this mis-reporting may 
have been over-estimated due to the presence of unobserved differences between 
workers and non-workers. Results from that paper indicate that unobservables should 
be incorporated into the reporting model. In this chapter, we therefore estimate 
reporting behaviour with and without controlling for unobserved effects -  this 
provides us with a more accurate magnitude of mis-reporting.
There are two main motivations for this chapter. Firstly, we wish to establish if 
economic incentives to mis-report exist in Ireland and how these compare to previous 
international research. Similar to other European countries there has been an increase 
in the number of disability benefit recipients in Ireland since the mid 1990s. 
Therefore, we would like to know if this represents an increase in the prevalence of 
true disability or is there an element of mis-reporting of disability status to justify 
being out of work and in receipt of disability payments. The main questions we 
address are ( 1 ) was there state dependent reporting error and did financial incentives 
play a role, and (2) did this change over the years 1995 to 2001? Our discussion puts 
forward some reasons for any potential change. The second motivation lies in the 
econometric methodology. The main contribution of this chapter to the international 
literature is in the manner we model the self-reported disability variable -  while 
previous research has used the generalised ordered probit model, we initially apply the 
corresponding logit model. This performs similarly to the probit model, but 
additionally allows us to simultaneously carry out model specification tests. In 
particular, we test the fundamental assumption that the objective measure satisfies the 
parallel regression theory. Previous research (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995) used 
likelihood ratio tests for a similar analysis in the probit model. The result of the 
specification test in our paper is similar to Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995), i.e. the 
objective variable does not affect reporting behaviour. In addition, we control for 
unobservables using a random effects generalised ordered probit model -  again, while 
the outcome of this would be similar to that if we used models outlined in previous 
research (e.g. Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002), we now have the advantage of a much
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longer panel of data; seven waves compared to two waves previously in Lindeboom 
and Kerkhofs, (2002). The latter paper demonstrated that with panel data we can then 
use a less complicated model to get an estimate of state dependent reporting 
behaviour. Their proposal was to use the time-averages of the potentially endogenous 
objective and labour force state variables as a control for correlation between the 
unobserved effect and these endogenous variables [i.e. Mundlak estimator]. The 
problem with short panels is that the time averages may be strongly correlated with 
the endogenous variables; therefore Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, (2002) stated their 
preferred method was to simultaneously estimate subjective and objective health. In 
our paper, because we have a much longer panel of data, we follow the Mundlak 
approach; the estimation procedure is less complicated but will achieve a similar 
outcome.
Our findings using Irish data are similar to previous international research; mis- 
reporting of disability is influenced by economic incentives in particular for the labour 
force groups of disabled/ill and retired. We add to international results by showing 
exactly how much mis-reporting is over-estimated once we control for unobserved 
effects. In terms of applied econometric models, the variant of the generalised ordered 
probit model applied in this chapter has not been used in previous research.
4.2 Irish System
Labour force participation changed dramatically in Ireland during the 1990s. The 
numbers in employment increased dramatically, and by 2 0 0 1  there was almost full 
employment, leaving an unemployment rate of 3.6%. For those who were still out of 
work, the eligibility rules for receiving unemployment assistance became more 
stringent, whereby unemployed persons must have proved they were actively seeking 
work to ensure continued receipt of unemployment assistance. The replacement rate— 
the ratio of unemployment benefits to after-tax wage income—was reduced from a 
high of 77 percent to 64 percent in 1994, a level below the OECD average. The Irish 
welfare system traditionally provided "more or less permanent support for the 
unemployed" with no maximum duration for unemployment assistance. In recent 
years, however, recipients in some age groups have been required to register in a
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public employment or training program if they wish to continue to receive benefits 
after their first six months on the rolls (Tille and Yi, 2001).
During a cycle of full employment, individuals that do not wish to work may be 
required to seek an alternative explanation for their non-participation. Psychological 
and financial incentives may influence them to state that they are unable to work. 
Perhaps some individuals who do not want to work would have claimed they had a 
disability in order to ( 1 ) get disability social welfare assistance, or to (2 ) justify 
themselves for not working. Two main types of disability payments exist in Ireland - 
Disability Allowance is a weekly allowance paid to people with a disability who are 
aged 16 or over and under age 6 6 . The disability must be expected to last for at least 
one year and the allowance is subject to both a medical suitability and a means test; 
Disability Benefit is a payment made to insured people who are unable to work due to 
illness. The proportion of the population in receipt of these payments increased 
between 1995 and 2000. This could be a reflection of improved access and 
information to social welfare payments for people with disabilities. On the other hand, 
it will be interesting to see if in fact there has been mis-reporting of disability status. 
The proportions receiving benefit fluctuate for all age groups indicating that it is not 
just because individuals are getting more disabilities as they get older, but that there 
are other reasons for the fluctuation in the proportions getting these payments.
Similar to the case of individuals who state their labour force status as disabled/ill or 
unemployed, those who are near retirement age may also be prone to exaggerating 
their disability status. A pre-retirement allowance is available for individuals who 
have been unemployed for over a year and are aged 55 and over. However, for those 
who wish to ‘retire’ at an earlier age, social assistance is less available. Individuals 
must prove they are unable to find work, so in this case they may be more inclined to 
report a disability and apply for disability benefits. The health and retirement 
literature has focused on this issue for the US, UK and the Netherlands, but to date 
there is no comparable analysis for Ireland, possibly because of data limitations.
By definition of the different labour force groups, we would expect varying levels of 
reported disability, and Table 4.1 confirms this expectation. For those who are 
employed there is a high proportion reporting no restriction or disability. Although
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5% are restricted in some way, we would expect that employed workers would not 
mis-report as there seems little incentive for them do so (Kreider, 1999). Unemployed 
individuals on the other hand are more likely to report a disability and we will need to 
disentangle whether this is true disability or mis-reporting with a view to obtaining 
disability allowance in the future. This may be difficult to do - it could be that due to 
lack of information they are claiming unemployment assistance rather than disability 
allowance, or it may be that they prefer to state their labour force status as 
unemployed rather than disabled, to avoid any potential discrimination. The 
disabled/ill group have a large proportion that say they are restricted in daily 
activities, as expected. About 14 per cent say that they are not restricted or have no 
disability. Our hypothesis is that the disabled/ill group may over-report for financial 
and psychological reasons, but this could also be true for the retired group. We show 
in Table 4.1 that almost one third report a limitation, so we hypothesise that this group 
may also over-report their disability status. The next group are the self-employed and 
we would expect that they have no incentive to mis-report -  about 8 % of them are 
restricted in some way. Finally, the other group include all others not represented in 
previous categories, including those in home duties. While these groups are not the 
focus of the chapter, it will be interesting to comment on their disability reporting 
behaviour.
Table 4.1 Labour Force Status by Restrictions, 1995-2001
Severe Some None No Disability N
Employed 0.61 4.6 3.3 91.5 19889
Unemployed 1.59 9.18 2.75 86.5 2069
Disabled/ill 33.1 52.6 4.94 9.35 1134
Retired 9.47 23.08 8.28 59.17 845
Self employed 1.04 6.93 3.76 88.27 2497
Other 2 . 0 2 9.52 4.22 84.25 14132
All 2.33 8.61 3.84 85.22 40566
Source: Calculations using Living In Ireland data 1995-2001
Another objective of this chapter is to determine if  the proportion mis-reporting a 
disability changed in any year. If so, this provides motivation for looking at changes 
in reporting behaviour and why this may have occurred. In Table 4.2 we show some
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administrative figures to support our proposal that individuals may have changed their 
reporting behaviour over the period18. First, we see that the number of applicants 
deemed as unqualified or who did not attend medical examination increased over the 
years. This could be the result of increased surveillance on this social welfare 
payment. It could also suggest that individuals were claiming they had a disability in 
an attempt to receive disability allowance. The increasing number of cases referred for 
examination but then not qualifying could support this view. Secondly, for Disability 
Benefit the number of applicants also increased dramatically up to 1998. Higher 
proportions were found capable of work after 1998. This suggests that individuals 
may have been over-reporting their disability status.
Table 4.2 % of unqualified/non-attendance to medical examinations
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Disability Allowance 
Cases referred for N/A N/A 6423 7229 8862 10285 9663
examination 
% Unqualified N/A N/A 28 32 30 28 31
% Non-attendance N/A N/A 25 26 27 33 32
Disability Benefit
Cases referred for 54226 52059 55089 63927 59224 45037 41710
examination 
% Capable of Work 14.8 12.8 13 11.8 12.5 15.6 15
% Non-attendance 29 31.4 30.3 32.0 30.7 27.6 29.8
Source: Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services, Department o f Social, Community and 
Fam ily Affairs
4.3 Model and Estimation
There are two types of possible endogeneity of disability within a labour force 
participation model -  (1 ) true disability status and work could be related through 
unobservables or a direct effect of labour market state on true disability (2 ) subjective 
reported disability and labour market state could be correlated -  i.e. there could be 
state dependent reporting error. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) suggest an approach 
that assumes away the first type of endogeneity, but this applies to a disability- 
reporting model only. In their later paper (2002), they demonstrate how this
18 In 1996 the administration of Disability Allowance was transferred to another government 
department, so we do not have data on the numbers in receipt of this in 1995 and 1996.
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endogeneity must also be controlled for in a participation model. In this chapter, we 
concentrate on the reporting model and return to the participation model in the next 
chapter.
We define reported disability as Ds (subjective reported disability), latent true 
disability as D* and objective disability as D°. The problem of differential 
measurement error occurs if reported disability does not accurately measure true 
disability due to its dependence on labour force status (L), so D s = f ( D * , L ) . As the 
value of true disability is unknown, (the latent D*), we use an objective measure of 
disability as a proxy. True disability may also be influenced by labour force status and 
some other explanatory variables (xi), e.g. education, soD* = f ( D ° , x \ , L ) X9. Within 
our model of reporting behaviour, this suggests endogeneity between true disability 
status and labour force status may be problematic, and therefore we need to find a 
model that will allow us to condition this out.
Following Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) an appropriate model is based on the 
assumption that conditional on the objective measure and other explanatory variables, 
labour force status provides no further information about true disability:
pdf(D* \ D \ x x,L) = pdf{D* \ D \ x x) .  [4.1]
This means that even though there could be endogeneity via the effect of labour 
market status on true disability, this is controlled for once we condition on objective
i *  i
disability and other exogenous variables. Any effect of L on D is captured by the 
objective measure of disability and the exogenous variables xi , so any remaining 
effect of L on disability is taken as evidence of state dependent reporting bias. This is 
the key identifying assumption of the model. The aim of the model is to compare 
subjective and objective measures of limitations and if  there are any remaining 
differences for any particular groups we can assume this is evidence of state 
dependent reporting bias. The question is how closely related is the objective measure
19 Reported disability may also be influenced by other explanatory variables, therefore
D s = f (D * ,L ,x 2) .
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to the subjective measure. If it is not a close substitute, then we must also control for 
observed individual characteristics (xj).
In summary the model is:
D* = f ( D \ Xl) D s = f ( D * , L , x 2) [4.2]
This may be estimated using generalised ordered response models where we assume
}|(
there is an unobservable latent disability measure D that is represented by objective 
disability, some other exogenous variables (xi) and a time invariant unobserved 
individual effect (8 ;):
D l = n D l )  +  x utP  +  S ^ e u [4.3]
In a standard ordered response model the unknown cut-points (or threshold 
parameters) are a ] < a 2 <... < a } , but now
a .  = a . + x itr J + 5 u, [4.4]
where in our case x consists of both L and other explanatory variables X2. It is also 
possible that the thresholds vary by time invariant unobserved individual effects, so 
we include S., .
We define
D su = 1 if D* < a,
D slt = 2  if a,  < D* < a 2
D-, = j  if  D * > a } [4.5]
where D ] =  1 if individuals are severely restricted in daily activities, D*t= 2 if they are 
restricted to some extent, D sit =3 if  they have no restrictions and D su =4 if  there is no
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disability. The cumulative probabilities of the discrete outcomes in the generalised 
ordered response model are;
Pr[Dj5 < j \ x il,S iJ] = F(aJ + x ily j + S iJ- x „ p ~ S , )  = F { a . - S e) j = l . J  [4.6]
The distribution F is either O or A depending on whether the distribution of the error 
term is normal or logistic respectively. This type of model has previously been 
estimated by a generalised ordered probit model (see Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002 
and Hemandez-Quevedo et al„ 2004). Instead we focus intially on the generalised 
ordered logit model -  it serves the same purpose and allows us to simultaneously test 
if D° and xi do in fact influence D* rather than Ds. To facilitate the inclusion of 
unobserved effects we later estimate the generalised ordered probit model. While we 
noted in Table 4.1 that there are differences in reported disability status between 
labour force groups, we also estimate an ordered logit model to look at the statistical 
significance of these differences and to provide baseline estimates of the cut-points. 
The standard ordered logit model is based on the parallel regression assumption 
whereby the cut-points do not vary by any of the explanatory variables. It is plausible 
however that the cut-points vary by labour force state, among other variables, so we 
test this assumption by applying the Brant (1990) test to determine if any variables do 
influence the cut-points differently.
In equation [4.6] we note that y ,  and [3 cannot be separately identified with the same
x entering the index function and the generalised thresholds, so we define / ? , = / ? -  y . .
Similarly, the components Sjj and 5. cannot be separately identified. The correct
specification of the generalised model depends on using appropriate variables in the 
index and the threshold part of the model. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) paid 
considerable attention to this issue, stating that inclusion of some exogenous variables 
in X2 rather than Xi may be undesirable, but nonetheless does not affect the 
performance of the model. However, if the objective disability measure is found to 
influence the thresholds, then specification of the model is not satisfactory. In their 
paper, they rely on likelihood ratio tests to assess the accuracy of their specifications. 
But by using the generalised ordered logit model we can simultaneously test whether
80
or not the explanatory variables and objective disability variables affect the 
thresholds. This is achieved by testing the hypothesis = 0. For example, if  y .  ^  0
then the variable in question should be included in the threshold part of the model. 
Effectively, this is the same as the Brant parallel regression assumption in the 
standard ordered logit model.
We estimate the generalised ordered response model first without unobserved 
individual effects and secondly including these effects. This means we can then 
identify the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity to reporting errors, and 
furthermore this allows us to compare our results to both Lindeboom and Kerkhofs 
(2002) and Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995). In this chapter, the model without 
unobserved effects is simply equation [4.3] and [4.4] where<5,= 0. This is similar to
the model of Kerkofs and Lindeboom, (1995). In their later paper (2002) however, 
they emphasised the importance of correcting for endogeneity of the objective health 
measure, and showed how the importance of reporting bias had been overstated in the 
earlier paper. They found that due to unobserved differences that exist between 
workers and disability recipients, the extent of over-reporting was less than previous. 
They account for this endogeneity by including an equation for the objective health 
measure as a function of work history, other observed characteristics and 
unobservables.
The estimation approach we use however is different -  we estimate a random effects 
generalised ordered probit model with correlated heterogeneity, i.e. we include 
unobserved effects into the index and threshold part of the generalised ordered probit 
model. This avoids the need to simultaneously model two separate equations for 
reported and objective disability but yet allows us to include unobserved effects into 
the reporting model. Boes and Winklemann (2006) use a similar model to estimate a 
model of subjective well-being, allowing the thresholds to vary by several 
characteristics including unobserved effects. Contoyannis et al. (2004) estimate a 
dynamic random effects ordered probit model and include unobserved effects into the 
model, but do not however let the thresholds vary by any of the explanatory variables 
or unobserved effects. Our model is a combination of these two models and includes 
unobserved effects in both the thresholds and index i.e., 5. ^  0 and Sy # 0 .
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This unobserved effect could be correlated with other explanatory variables, for 
example xi, X2  or L. To control for this, we follow the approach of Mundlak (1978) 
whereby the distribution of the unobserved effect is conditional on the time-averages 
of any potentially endogenous variables. To allow for possible correlation between Sij
and xu, we condition on the unobserved effects using the Mundlak model:
S.. = j jx ,  + a,. [4.7]
where ai \ xj ~ Normal(0,cr2) . If we expected that the individual unobserved effect is 
only correlated with variables in the index part of the ordered response model, then 
Si =<jocu + a i and the complete model could be estimated using a standard random
effects ordered probit model. It is also possible that there are some unobserved effects 
that influence both labour force status and the thresholds of this model - the 
unobserved effect could be correlated with labour force status. In that case we should 
include individual effects that affect each threshold differently. By conditioning on 
the unobservables we can control for unobserved individual effects that affect 
reported disability status as well as labour force status. In this case, <j>j =</>- <j>j, so if
the same unobserved effect enters the index function and thresholds, then the two
components cannot be separately identified20. In other words, <j>j would be a
combination of the two unobserved effects. The final model is based on equations
[4.3] and [4.7], and is estimated using the random effects ordered probit model 
incorporating means of the explanatory variables into both the index and threshold 
parts of the models. The coefficients are re-scaled so that we can compare the results 
to those from the pooled models -  this is achieved by dividing the parameter estimates
from the random effects model by j^(\ -I- cr2 21.
20 Unobserved effects in the cut-points are </)jX/ +  a u and in the index are <f)Xj +  a 2 j . The complete 
unobserved effect is therefore <f>j =  </) — (j)j.
21 We change to a probit model at this stage to facilitate estimation. Because we are not directly 
comparing the coefficients (we only measure the magnitude o f predictions relative to the employed), 
this does not affect our final conclusions. We also estimated probit models similar to the standard logit, 
and generalised ordered logit, and results confirm that are conclusions are the same.
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Finally, using the models with and without unobserved heterogeneity, we predict 
responses of individuals to the disability questions, as if  they were employed. This is 
our relative measure of mis-reporting disability status and is interpreted as the 
economic incentives effect. Our results are compared to those of both Lindeboom and 
Kerkhofs, (2002) and Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995), but in addition to previous 
research we can identify the contribution of unobserved effects to mis-reporting.
4.4 Data
The data on disability and labour force participation in Ireland are from the Living in 
Ireland Survey 1995-2001. We wish to focus on individuals of working age, hence we 
exclude those aged 65 and over. A full listing of the variables used are given in Table 
4.3.
Table 4.3 Variable definitions for Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable D efinition
Reported Disability
Unemployed
Disabled/ill
Retired
Self employed
Other
Female
Secondary Education 
Third Level Education
Married
Age
Visits
Stress
= 1  if severely restricted in daily activities 
= 2  if restricted to some extent in daily activities 
=3 if not restricted in daily activities 
=4 if  no disability reported
= 1  if labour force status is unemployed, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if labour force status is disabled/ill, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if labour force status is retired, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if labour force status is self employed, = 0  otherwise 
= 1  if labour force status is training, home duties, education, 
= 0  otherwise
(Base category=Employed)
= 1  if female, = 0  otherwise
= 1  if highest level of education completed is secondary, = 0  
otherwise
= 1  if highest level of education completed is third level, = 0  
otherwise
(Base category=No qualifications or highest level of 
education completed is primary)
= 1  if  married or living with a partner, = 0  otherwise 
= age in years
=1 if  Number of GP visits during last 12 months>5 and 
Number of Hospital visits during last 12 months>0 
= 0  otherwise
= 1  if cut down on normal activities due to illness or injury, 
or emotional or mental health problems and 
GHQ12>2 and
Not Satisfied with Work or Daily Activity 
= 0  otherwise
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An ordered measure of reported disability is constructed from the Living in Ireland 
survey on the basis of individual responses to the following question:
“Do you have any chronic, physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?” 
We use responses to a follow-up question concerning the impact of the disability to 
distinguish between severe, to some extent and no limitations in daily activities.
Our model implies that the objective should be reliable. The variable (along with X] 
variables if necessary) should be a sufficient statistic for the effect of labour force 
status on true disability. The most appropriate measure would be physicians’ reports 
but this is usually not available in individual surveys. Previous research has used other 
less objective but relevant health measures, for this purpose. For example, in their 
assessment of self-assessed health, Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) use the 
McMaster Health Utility Index, a generic health status index developed at McMaster 
University that measures both quantitative and qualitative aspects of health. This 
measure also relies on self-reporting but the advantage is that respondents are only 
required to answer to 8  health attributes, and then using weights, (derived from a 
different valuation survey and different sample) an overall health utility score on a 
scale of zero to one is derived. Hernandez-Quevedo et al. (2004) use the SF36 
questionnaire and compare it to self-assessed health. This includes 36 items that 
measure health across 8  dimensions of health. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) note 
that to find an objective measure that is correlated with work related health is a 
difficult task and for that reason focus on self-assessed health. However, they go on in 
a later paper (2 0 0 2 ) and compare the same objective measure to self-reported work 
related health. The aim of this paper is to focus on limitations in daily activities, so we 
will need to find suitable objective measures for comparison purposes in our model 
that will act as a sufficient statistic for the effect of labour market status on true 
disability. In the Living in Ireland data there is no complete objective disability 
measure suitable for the purposes of this model. We therefore use proxies of disability 
status. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) suggest using GP visiting rates - there is an 
expectation that individuals with a higher number of GP visits per year will most 
likely be less healthy than individuals who do not visit their GP to the same extent. 
Furthermore, almost 18% of acquired disabilities in Ireland were work related in 2002 
(QNHS), so to capture the effect of major work accidents we create a variable called 
Visits if an individual made 5 or more GP visits and at least one Hospital visit within 
the previous year. The second work related disability we control for relates to stress
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Table 4.4 Ordered Logit of reported Disability Status
Coefficient
Unemployed -0.5388**
Disabled/ill -3.7131**
Retired -1.3432**
Self Employed -0.0956
Other -0.4305**
(refer ence=employed)
Age -0.0257**
Female -0.1904**
Secondary Education 0.3939**
Third level Education 0.5620**
(reference group=primary or no qualifications)
Married 0.0207
Year -0.0233**
a 1 -5.7732
a 2 -3.6177
a 3 -3.1873
Pseudo R2 0.1161
N 33126
* * p  < 0 .05,*p  < 0.10
These coefficients clearly indicate that the disabled/ill and retired have a higher 
propensity to report restrictions in daily activities, compared to the employed. The 
negative coefficients on age, female and year indicate that for older people, women 
and in later years in the sample, the probability of severe limitations is higher 
compared to younger people, men, and in earlier years respectively. The positive 
coefficient on education shows that with increased education, the probability of no 
disability will increase and that of severe limitations will decrease. All of these results 
are as expected.
The main focus of our results is on the effect o f labour force status on reported 
disability. Before determining if  there is state dependent reporting behaviour of
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disability, we firstly establish that there are actual differences in reported disability 
across labour market states. Results in Table 4.4 indicated that the disabled/ill and 
retired were more likely to report a limiting disability, so we next present the results 
from a simple generalised ordered logit model of limitations where the thresholds are 
allowed to vary by independent characteristics, again with employed individuals as 
the reference group. Initially we let the thresholds vary by labour force status only, 
but we should bear in mind that other observed factors including a measure of 
objective health have yet to be included into the model.
Table 4.5 presents results from the basic generalised ordered logit model including the 
cut-off points for each of the labour force groups. For severe limitations, and in each 
of the labour force groups, the cut-off points (a i) lie to the right of that for the 
employed group. This implies that all other labour force groups report the probability 
of severe limitations in a different manner to those in work. The groups that are 
further to the right are the disabled/ill and retired, showing that the extent of their 
reporting of some limitations is much greater. The next set of cut-off points ((X2 ) 
represents the probability of reporting severe or some limitations, compared to no 
limitations or no disability. Again, the results show that the cut-off points for the 
disabled/ill and retired are to the right of that of the employed, indicating different 
reporting behaviour. Finally, 013 represents all types of limitations v no limitations.
We also estimate this model and let the thresholds vary by year - the cut-off points are 
generally the same and the year variable is significant for 013 only. Individuals are less 
likely to report ‘no disability’ later on in the 1995 to 2001 period -  we return to 
potential explanations for this result once we establish if  disability reporting 
fluctuated over the period after we compare the subjective and objective measures of 
disability.
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Table 4.5 Generalised Ordered Logit of Limitations Cut-Off Points
Gi a 2 a 3
Cut points Severe Some None
Employed (ref. Group) -5.091 -2.9024 -2.37
Unemployed -4.3401 -2.0691 -1.8433
Disabled/ill -0.9803 1.6656 2.1284
Retired -2.3235 -0.8089 -0.4278
Self employed -4.7505 -2.5248 -2.1225
Other -4.023 -2.0402 -1.6661
Log likelihood -16153.15
Pseudo R 2 0.099
N 33126
Are the differences in the probability of reported disability status actually reporting 
behaviour or simply a reflection of true disability? As demonstrated in section 4.3, to 
establish this we would need to introduce an objective measure and then look at the 
cut-points.
Following the approach of Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) the subjective and 
objective disability are compared to identify state dependent reporting errors, and this 
is achieved by estimating a generalised ordered logit model. We suspect that the 
objective measures used here are not highly correlated with the subjective measure of 
disability and may not capture the full extent of labour market effects on true 
disability, so other explanatory variables such as education, gender and marital status 
are included into the model. The decision on what variables to include in the reporting 
part of the model is a matter of judgement, so to facilitate this we estimate the model 
while at the same time testing the parallel assumption for each variable. If a variable 
fails the parallel assumption test, then it perhaps should be included in the reporting 
part of the model, where the thresholds vary by that variable. As noted by Kerkhofs 
and Lindeboom (1995) if the objective disability variable affects the thresholds 
differently, then specification of the estimated model is not satisfactory. Therefore, 
one of the most important results from our model is that the objective measure of 
disability does satisfy the parallel regression assumption. As we have hypothesised, 
the results from this model indicate that the thresholds should vary by all labour force 
status groups, with the exception of the self-employed -  they are found to have similar 
thresholds in reporting disability, as the employed. The thresholds are also found to 
vary by age, but not by educational attainment. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) show 
a similar result in terms of education, but they also show that the thresholds do not
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vary by age. Finally, our results suggest that the thresholds should vary by year. This 
is an important result, suggesting that reporting behaviour may vary over time. A 
significant coefficient was found for the third threshold, although the magnitude is 
quite small. Nonetheless, it does indicate that we should explore the changes in 
reporting behaviour over time.
The results from the generalised ordered logit model with thresholds varying by 
labour force status are shown in Table 4.6. Compared to results in Table 4.5, the out­
points for all labour force groups are now closer, but still much larger for disabled/ill 
and retired people. The main reason for this difference is that we have now 
conditioned on objective disability and once this is controlled for the gaps in reported 
disability between labour force states is now reduced. The differences across labour 
force groups that we presented earlier in Table 4.5 may be partially explained by true 
disability differentials. The remaining differences shown in Table 4.6 are therefore 
due to systematic reporting behaviour.
Table 4.6 Generalised ordered logit with thresholds varying by LFS_________
P qi a 2   a 3
Stress -2.5847**
Visits -1.5533**
Female -0.0762
Married 0.0822
Self employed -0.0795
Secondary Education 0.3647**
Third Level Education 0.5356**
Employed -5.7191 -3.8335 -3.3835
Unemployed -5.2298 -3.1153 -2.9409
Disabled/ill -2.7367 -0.0762 0.3242
Retired -3.8075 -2.6601 -2.2878
Other -5.0188 -3.3297 -2.9983
Pseudo R2 0.1536
Log likelihood -15173.189
N_______________________________ 33126
* * p <  0.05,*/; < 0.10 (Full regression results are in Appendix Table A4.1)
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The results from this model are directly comparable to those of the logit model in 
Table 4.5, but nonetheless show that there is a substantial element of mis-reporting 
severe and some limitations for individuals in the disabled/ill labour force group. 
However, as proposed in section 4.3, this model should ideally control for unobserved 
effects. Once these are included, the extent of mis-reporting is much lower. Results 
from this model are presented in Table 4.7, showing that the cut-points are now higher 
for the disabled/ill group compared to the employed. The cut-points for the retired are 
now slightly closer to those of the employed, suggesting that unobserved effects do 
play a role but not to the same extent as for the disabled/ill group.
Table 4.7 Generalised ordered probit with unobserved effects 
___________________________ Ü___________ qi___________ c[2___________ a3
Stress -1.1356**
Visits -0.5778**
Female -0.0665
Married 0.0689
Self employed 0.1573
Secondary Education -0.0425
Third Level Education -0.0345
Employed -5.0278 -3.8321 -3.4971
Unemployed -4.6383 -3.6388 -3.3505
Disabled/ill -3.9309 -2.2732 -1.8685
Retired -1.0618 -0.8477 -0.8675
Other -0.5217 -0.1931 -0.1825
Log likelihood -12661.092
N_____________________  33126
* *p < 0.05,*p <0.10 (Full regression results are in Appendix Table A4.2)
Following Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) we now compute cleansed measures of 
disability status. This is achieved by computing what individuals’ responses would 
have been, had they been employed. Figure A4.1 graphs the differences between 
actual and average predicted probabilities of reported disability status for each labour 
force group. Without unobserved effects this illustrates that on average the 
unemployed and other group are more likely to report their disability status the same 
as if they were employed, throughout the period 1995-2001. Conversely, we find that
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the disabled/ill and retired would be much less likely to report a severe limitation if 
they were employed. The disabled/ill and retired groups would have a higher 
probability of reporting no disability. If we look at each category of disability in more 
detail, the unemployed would be more likely to report no limitations instead of some 
limitations.
Using the model with unobserved effects, a set of cleansed measures of disability are 
constructed and Figure A4.1 shows that mis-reporting is now lower, in particular for 
the disabled/ill group. Our results are consistent with similar research in the 
Netherlands by Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2002). The latter paper concludes that bad 
health was mis-reported by two thirds of the disabled group -  our results indicate that 
severe or some limitations are also over-reported by about two thirds of the 
disabled/ill group22. Their later paper (2002) demonstrated that without unobserved 
effects the extent of mis-reporting may be overestimated -  we find similar results for 
the disabled/ill group.
Overall, the results in this paper suggest that reporting disability does depend on 
labour force status. In particular, we find that compared to the employed, the retired 
and disabled/ill are prone to over-reporting their disability23. In interpreting their 
results, the authors assume that labour force status sufficiently describes the effect of 
financial incentives in the Netherlands social welfare system. The same interpretation 
is applied to our model so we conclude that economic incentives do influence reported 
disability status.
We also explore whether or not the reporting behaviour changed in any year. For a 
few reasons, it is possible that there were changes in mis-reporting over the years
22 It is difficult to precisely compare the impact o f unobserved effects between the two papers by 
Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (1995,2002) because they use self assessed health in the first paper and work 
limiting disability in the second. Nonetheless, their results are broadly similar to ours -  when they do 
not control for unobserved effects, approximately three quarters o f the disabled group are found to mis- 
report bad or sometimes bad self assessed health -  this compares to a similar proportion o f individuals 
in our disabled/ill group mis-reporting severe or some limitations when we do not control for 
unobserved effects.
23 We also estimated a model that compared reporting behaviour to the disabled/ill group. Results 
suggest that if  the employed reported severe disability status as i f  they were in the disabled/ill labour 
force group, then the magnitude o f mis-reporting is the same -  i.e. the employed would have almost 10 
times as many people reporting a severe disability in the model. This compares to our finding o f the 
disabled/ill group reporting 10 times less disability i f  reporting as i f  employed, confirming that our 
results are a measure o f relative magnitude.
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1995-2001. Economic incentives may play a role, and we discuss two possible 
influences that may have affected reporting of disability over 1995 to 2001. Firstly, in 
1996 the administration of Disability Allowance was transferred from the Department 
of Health to the Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs. The purpose 
of this was to integrate income maintenance payments and to streamline the process 
for social welfare payments for the disabled more generally. Before 1996, an 
individual may have mis-reported disability but post-1996, the incentive to do so may 
have been reduced as the social welfare process may have become more efficient. It is 
possible that non-working people with disabilities would give incorrect reports of 
disability, but for employed people their reports of disability should be correct. 
Kreider (1999), analysing the effect of ‘biased’ disability limitations on non-work, 
assumed that workers report correctly but non-workers do not.
The second potential contributor to reporting behaviour is the Employment Equality 
Act 1998, whereby disability is one of the grounds on which discrimination in the 
workplace cannot occur. The effect of this legislation on mis-reporting o f disability 
could work in two ways - previous research has shown negative effects of similar 
legislation in the US where employers were less likely to hire individuals with 
disabilities as it became more costly with the new requirements (Acemoglu and 
Angrist, (2001). In this case demand was reduced, and unemployment for people with 
disabilities increased. This could influence people with disabilities to underreport. On 
the other hand, now that people with disabilities may feel they could be less 
discriminated against by employers, they might be inclined to either report their true 
disability status or even over-report their disability status. In this case the unemployed 
may be more likely to mis-report. Employees reporting behaviour should not be 
affected by the Employment Equality Act 1998 -  unless they are in work already and 
are seeking employment rights as set out by this Act24. This is an important 
assumption in the model outlined earlier - it assumes that currently employed 
individuals do not respond in anticipation to future events (Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 
2002).
24 Very few cases of discrimination on the grounds o f disability were taken to the Equality Authority 
between 1998 and 2001 -  it is unlikely therefore that employee’s reporting behaviour is influenced by
the 1998 Act.
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Using the generalised ordered logit model, we analyse reporting behaviour for three 
groups of years 1995-1996, 1997-1998 and 1999-2001. Figure A4.2 includes a 
comparison of the actual and predicted probabilities if  employed, of having a severely 
limiting disability for group. The differences for the disabled/ill group fluctuate 
slightly between 1995 and 2001. Looking at predictions of reporting severe 
restrictions, the graph shows that after 1996 and 1997 there appears to be less over­
reporting. This increased in 1998 to 2001. For the retired, there was an increase in the 
difference between actual and predicted as if  employed probabilities again after 1996 
and remained much the same up to 2001. However, the extent of over-reporting is 
greater for the disabled/ill group.
Overall though, the difference between actual and cleansed measures of reported 
disability barely fluctuated between 1995 and 2001. So, it is unlikely that the change 
in administration in 1996, or the 1998 Act had any significant influence on the mis- 
reporting of disability status. It could be that labour force conditions were a driving 
factor in the majority of mis-reports -  for example, as employment levels increased 
individuals may have reported a disability in an attempt to receive social assistance.
4.6 Additional Evidence of mis-reporting in Ireland
Until recently in Ireland, there was no statistical evidence of overpayments of social 
welfare for disabilities. In addition to this econometric study in this chapter, the Public 
Accounts Committee (2006) reviewed a pilot initiative of intensive monitoring of 
disability payments. The background to this evolved from a finding that lower back 
pain cases represented 17% of all disability benefit claims in 2002. Resources were 
then redirected to a pilot initiative that gave priority in medical examinations for these 
cases. As a result, many cases were found to be capable of working and the success of 
this initiative suggested that early intervention may be necessary for other ailments. 
Only 154 of the original 1532 claimants qualified for disability benefit due to lower 
back pain. In terms of medical assessment, this report recommended that reassessment 
should take place - 16 claimants of disability allowance were reassessed in 2003 and 
all were found not qualified, but we should bear in mind that they may qualify for 
other illness benefits under the social welfare system. For example in 2005, 
approximately 950 people found capable of work did not go back to work but availed
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of other schemes. Of course, some may not have been successful in getting 
employment so this is an issue that needs to be addressed.
There are two plausible explanations for the large number found capable of working, 
( 1 ) they may have been mis-reporting disability or (2 ) the large proportion found 
capable may be partially due to the backlog of medical examinations so that 
individuals have recovered by the time their medical examination took place. It is 
likely though that people found capable of working then claimed other social welfare 
benefits -  so even though overpayments had been made, the overall expenditure 
saving was minimal. Nonetheless, the department of social welfare spends in excess 
of €23m each year on fees to medical practitioners in respect of certificates and 
medical reports -  whereas the total cost of medical assessment is about €3.6 m per 
year -  the Public Accounts Committee believed that if the department had a process 
of reviewing certificates by GPs, particularly against the opinion of the subsequent 
medical assessments, then money could be saved.
4.7 International Comparisons of Mis-reporting
The findings from our econometric study are quite similar to those found by Kerfhofs 
and Lindeboom (1995, 2002). In their 1995 paper they assess the magnitude of mis- 
reporting of self assessed health and find that about three quarters of all individuals 
who state their labour force group as Disabled/Ill would not report bad or to some 
extent bad health, if they responded as employed. Although we measure mis-reporting 
of a slightly different variable, i.e. self reported limitations, we find that about the 
same proportion of the Disabled/Ill labour force group would not report a severe or to 
some extent limiting disability/chronic illness, if responding as if employed. When we 
introduce unobserved effects into the model and control for the fact that mis-reporting 
may be due to some unobserved individual characteristics such as previous 
investments in health or education, we find the same result as Lindeboom and 
Kerkhofs (2002). These results are even more comparable because they focus on work 
limiting disability in their 2002 paper. Both models find that approximately 60 per 
cent of the disabled group over-report having a severe or to some extent limiting 
disability. This reduces the proportions in similar magnitudes, so the differences in the 
prevalence of disability across countries remain the same. If we suspect that
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differences in disability rates across countries are due to the presence of different 
social security systems, then we would expect that in the Netherlands there should be 
more mis-reporting than in Ireland. However, we have only discussed the differences 
within the disabled/ill group and we would need exact figures of actual reported 
disability across each labour force group, to precisely calculate differences across 
countries in the overall rate of reported disability.
Our findings for the retired group are different to those from the Netherlands -  we 
find that there is substantial mis-reporting among the retired. About one fifth of those 
who report a disability would do so if they were employed. In the Netherlands 
however the level of reporting for the early retired group is quite similar to that of the 
employed. It is possible that differences in mis-reporting between the retired and 
disabled group arise in the Netherlands, because of different economic incentives for 
each group. Early retirement schemes were very popular in the 1980s and 1990s in the 
Netherlands as a means of encouraging people to leave the workforce to make room 
for a younger workforce. This means that older workers would not need to mis-report 
a disability in order to leave the workforce, as the direct retirement route was clearly 
possible. Given the changing demographics this is no longer necessary and the Dutch 
social partners have agreed that incentives for early retirement need to be reduced. 
Early retirement schemes are slowly being replaced by pre-pension arrangements 
shifting the burden of the cost from employers to the individual worker making the 
decision. Still, the OECD (2003) has reported that more needs to be done to reduce 
the incentives for early retirement. This may have implications for future mis- 
reporting of disability. In Ireland however, the incentives are similar for everyone up 
to age 6 6 , so perhaps the retired group are simply a subset of the disabled/ill groups in 
terms of their reporting behaviour. Unless we analyse a harmonised dataset, we 
cannot precisely compare across different labour force groups, and even at that 
cultural and social norms will play a significant role in responses to similar questions. 
Kapteyn et al. (2004) found that for the same level of actual work disability, Dutch 
respondents have a lower response threshold in claiming disability than American 
respondents. Their evidence shows that especially in the more subjective health 
problems of pain and emotion, Americans use a tougher standard when assigning 
work disability status. Why these differences exist is another question, to some extent 
it may be due to differences in social welfare and/or social norms.
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Once the evidence of mis-reporting is established, the next step in terms of policy is to 
try and reduce this reporting behaviour. In the Netherlands, this proved to be a 
difficult task and after many policy changes and pilot initiatives, the final outcome 
was to reduce the number of fraudulent disability insurance applications. In the 
Netherlands, around 10% of the working age population were collecting benefits in 
the early 1990s. A major reform of the disability insurance scheme took place in 
1993/1994 but there was no sustainable reduction in the numbers entering the scheme. 
Some of this may be attributed to a buoyant labour market whereby lower 
unemployment levels mean that individuals are more likely to aim for disability 
insurance schemes. In addition, they are less likely to loose their job when labour 
market conditions are good. More stringent measures were introduced in 2002 mainly 
because of institutional improvements2 5  and for the first time in seven years the total 
number of beneficiaries declined. Some of this decline may be cyclical (Dutch 
economy was in a period of recession and inflow to unemployment insurance 
increased) but recent research shows that in fact intensified screening of sickness 
absence also reduces the number of disability insurance applications, (de Jong, 
Lindeboom and van der Klaauw, (2006)). The current challenges facing the 
Netherlands now are to reassess the stock of existing beneficiaries, restrict full 
benefits to severe cases and reduce access to partial benefits from people with mild 
disabilities that do not affect their daily functioning and work ability.
In Spain, Jiminez-Martin et al. (2006) found that individuals aged between 55 and 59 
had a significantly higher probability of receiving overpayments of disability benefit, 
compared to those aged 60-64. Their results confirm that disability benefits are being 
used as a way of exiting the labour force before the retirement age of 61. While they 
do not specifically analyse the award errors for people aged less than 55, it is likely 
that this may also be a problem in Spain. One of the main sources of income for 
disabled persons is disability benefits, approximately 35 per cent receive benefits 
compared to an EU average of about 20 per cent, (OECD 2003). Jiminez-Martin et al. 
(2006) make some recommendations for more medical tests but recognise the
25 Stricter obligations on re-integration came into force in 2002 for employees on long term sickness 
benefits. The five disability benefit agencies were merged reducing the influence of sector interests on 
the disability benefit authority. Penalties for firms became stronger.
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expenditure involved. But as we saw earlier the costs are likely to only be a small 
fraction of the benefits (Netherlands). More recently, the Spanish Observatory of the 
Social Security System proposed reforms in the regulation of permanent disability 
benefits. These included approval of a list of occupational diseases and the exclusion 
of professions that are no longer suited to old-aged workers. In relation to this, they 
propose to modify retirement benefits by relaxing the restrictions on age for these 
professions.
In the US, Gruber (2000) notes that the level of disability insurance is 42% of 
previous earnings on average and mostly non-taxable. They fear that this could be 
subsidizing early retirement of older workers who have no other reason for retiring. 
Nonetheless, a replacement rate of 42% is quite low compared to the Netherlands, and 
this could be a contributing factor to the higher rates of disability in the Netherlands 
compared to the US. There is also evidence of mis-reporting of disability status 
among older workers, although there are conflicting results between earlier and more 
recent studies. Kreider (1999) found that non-workers overreport work limitations. 
Their main focus was on the consequential econometric issues involved in labour 
force participation models, rather than the relationship between reporting and social 
security benefits for disabled people. Bound (1989) found that they were no dis­
incentive effects of disability benefit -  most people on disability insurance were found 
to be healthy and half of those who had been rejected disability insurance were then 
found capable of work. This would suggest that in the US the level of benefits does 
not contribute to mis-reporting, but moreso that it is a favourable route towards 
retirement. Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) analysed the 45-64 age group during the 1992- 
93 period and found that a person’s evaluation of health is similar to Social Security 
Award evaluation. Given that expenditure on disability benefits in the US is quite low 
at less than one per cent of GDP, and the fact that the disability rate is quite low, we 
should not expect a high level of mis-reporting. Kreider and Benitez-Silva et al. give 
conflicting results but the earlier paper by Kreider only focus on 1992/93 whereas 
Benitez-Silva et al. focus on data up to 1996 -  it is possible that the different results 
are due to cyclical variation.
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The question is what type of policy reform is needed and to what extent this should be 
monitored. Policy reform (but not effectively monitored), in terms of eligibility 
conditions, does not seem to be enough according to evidence from the Netherlands. 
The same level of mis-reporting can be observed in Ireland even though there was not 
much reform. In Ireland, the disability schemes are targeted towards a diverse group 
depending on severity and duration of illness/disability and there was little reform in 
terms of disability policy during the period 1995-2001. Benefits increased in line with 
other social welfare payments and there were very few institutional changes.
In 1996 the payment of disability allowance was moved from the Department of 
Health to the Department of Social Community and Family Affairs. The purpose of 
this was to integrate income maintenance payments and to streamline the process for 
social welfare payments for the disabled more generally. The expectation was that this 
might reduce the level of potential overpayments within the system, nonetheless as we 
saw earlier the number of beneficiaries increased significantly but at the same time the 
level of mis-reporting only changed marginally. In 2003, a report from the 
Department o f  Social Community and Family Affairs reviewed expenditure on illness 
and disability schemes. One o f  their main recommendations was to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the system by introducing a simpler one. But more 
recently, the PAC reported on the level of overpayments still within the system. The 
PAC report recognised the level of work that has been done to eliminate 
overpayments in the social welfare system but recommended that the Department of 
Social Welfare should introduce further systems of integration with the Revenue 
Commissioners in order to streamline systems and reduce time taken to detect 
overpayments. There should also be greater liaison between GPs certificates and 
medical assessments from the Department. While the level of overpayments may then 
be reduced it is likely however that individuals no longer entitled to disability 
payments will seek payment from another social welfare scheme -  thus it is important 
that policy also ensures that individuals are re-integrated in to the labour market once 
they are capable of working.
4.8 Implications for policy in Ireland
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The implications from the more stringent measures in the Netherlands and the pilot 
initiative in Ireland are that this is a successful approach to reducing overpayments of 
disability welfare and ensuring that the appropriate people receive benefits. A cost- 
benefit analysis by de Jong et al. (2006), shows that the costs of intensified screening 
are only a small fraction of the benefits. There is a strong case therefore for a similar 
cost-benefit analysis to be carried out in Ireland and additionally for a nationwide 
expansion of the pilot initiative. The lesson to be learned from the Netherlands is that 
reform of the schemes is not sufficient without effective monitoring. It is crucial 
however that reform does not affect those who are currently receiving disability 
payments if they are genuinely in need of assistance. An efficient monitoring system 
should appropriately distinguish between those in genuine need of social welfare and 
those who are mis-reporting or no longer incapable of work.
4.9 C onclusions
In this chapter, we assessed the extent of differential measurement error in the self- 
reported disability variable. Mis-reporting of limitations in daily activities was 
examined, in particular for those who define their labour force status as disabled/ill or 
retired. The main questions addressed were (1) was there state dependent reporting 
error and did financial incentives play a role, and (2 ) did this change over the years 
1995 to 2001? Using generalised ordered response models we created a cleansed 
measure of disability and our results indicate that the disabled/ill and retired groups 
did over-report. The extent of this mis-reporting is lower when we account for 
unobserved individual characteristics, so overall the level of mis-reporting could be 
viewed as lying somewhere between the results from the models with and without 
unobserved heterogeneity. We take this as evidence of economic incentives 
influencing reporting behaviour, but should bear in mind that age and year are also 
found to contribute to the thresholds. Overall though, the difference between actual 
and cleansed measures of reported disability barely fluctuated between 1995 and 
2001.
The policy implications for Ireland are:
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• a need for review of the medical assessment procedure in order to reduce 
waiting times, and to reduce expenditure from Department of Social and 
Family Affairs to medical practitioners;
• introduce further systems of integration between Department of Social and 
Family Affairs and Revenue Commissioners in order to reduce time taken to 
detect overpayments;
• cost-benefit analysis of intensified screening should be carried out;
• effective monitoring of disability benefits is required, perhaps by making the
pilot initiative a nationwide policy;
• individuals found capable of work need to be re-integrated into the labour
force, so as to reduce the number applying for other social welfare payments.
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A p p en d ix  4
Table A4.1 Coefficients from Generalised Ordered Logit Model
Coefficients on 
variables not 
varying by 
threshold
>=some 
restrictions (ie. 
Group 2,3,4)
>=no restrictions 
(i.e. group 3,4)
No Disability (i.e. 
group 4)
Stress -2.5847**
Visits -1.5533**
Female -0.0762
Married 0.0822
Self employed 
Secondary 
Education 
Third Level 
Education
-0.0795
0.3647**
0.5356**
Disabled/ill -2.9824** -3.7573** -3.7077**
Unemployed -0.4893* -0.7178** -0.4426**
Retired -1.9116** -1.1734** -1.0957**
Other -0.7003** -0.5039** -0.3852**
Age -0.0189** -0.0296** -0.0289**
Year -0.0191 -0.0056 -0.0290**
Constant 5.7191** 3.8335** 3.3835**
* *p < 0.05 ,*p  < 0 .1 0
Note: Coefficients are rescaled by -J(1 +  £t J before the predicted responses are calculated. We
estimate predicted probabilities and find that the actual and predicted probabilities are quite similar, 
indicating a good measure o f fit for our model.
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Tabic A4.2 Coefficients with random effects and correlated heterogeneity
Coefficients on variables not >=some >=no No Disability
varying by threshold restrictions restrictions (i.e. (i.e. group 4)
(ie. Group group 3,4)
_________________________________________ W ) __________________________________________________
Stress -1.1356**
Visits -0.5778**
Female -0.0665
Married 0.0689
Self employed
Secondary
Education
Third Level
Education
Disabled/ill
0.1573
-0.0425
-0.0345
-1.0969** -1.5589** -1.6286**
Unemployed -0.3895* -0.1933* -0.1466
Retired -1.0618** -0.8477** -0.8675**
Other -0.5217** -0.1930** -0.1825**
Age -0.0269 -0.0716** -0.0604**
Year -0.0132 0.0229 -0.0086
Constant 5.0278** 3.8321** 3.4971**
* * p <  0.05,*/; <0.10
Note: Coefficients are rescaled by f ( \  + crl before the pred ic ted  responses are  
calculated.
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Figure A4.1 Actual v Predicted Probabilities -average of 1995-2001
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Figure A4.2 Difference between Actual and Predicted Probabilities of Severe 
Limitations if Employed by Year 1995-2001
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Chapter Five
Adjusting for Endogeneity and Measurement Error o f self-reported 
disability in a Labour Force Participation model
5.1 Introduction
Chapter one set out the main estimation issues involved in attempting to find an 
unbiased estimate of disability in a labour force participation model. In summary, 
classical endogeneity via unobserved heterogeneity coupled with measurement error 
(classical and/or differential) in reported disability can lead to biased estimates. 
Classical measurement error will lead to a downward bias, whereas differential 
measurement error and classical endogeneity will result in an upward bias. This chapter 
aims to tackle each of these problems in a complete model of disability and labour force 
participation. The issue of classical and differential measurement error is resolved by 
estimating a cleansed measure of disability from a correlated random effects generalised 
ordered probit model. In Chapter four, I showed that this model predicts that the 
proportion of disabled/ill people reporting a disability would be halved, if  reporting as if 
they were employed. This chapter now takes the cleansed measure of disability and 
includes this as an indicator of true disability (relative to the employed) in the 
participation model. In earlier chapters the disability variable was split into four 
categories reflecting severe limitations, some limitations, no limitations and the 
reference group of no disability. We now define disability as a dichotomous variable 
that equals 1 if an individual is either severely or to some extent limited, and equals 0  if 
an individual has no limitations or no disability -  this facilitates comparisons of our 
results to those from international research. Similar to the procedure outlined in Chapter 
three, the presence of unobservables that influence both disability and labour force 
participation (i.e. classical endogeneity) is controlled for by using the Mundlak (1978) 
estimator.
This chapter provides results from a complete model o f disability and participation. It 
brings together the endogeneity discussed in Chapter three and the measurement error 
examined in Chapter four. The contribution of this chapter to the debate on the impact 
of disability on participation in Ireland is significant. In light of the new results from 
this chapter, we find that the true impact of disability is to reduce participation by about 
15 percentage points. Compared to the baseline estimate of 26 percentage points, we
find that about half of the bias is due to unobservables, and the remaining half is a 
combination of differential and classical measurement error.
In terms of contribution to the international literature, we build on the model presented 
in Chapter three by adjusting for classical and differential measurement error. Although, 
the model in Chapter three implicitly controlled for differential measurement error, we 
did not distinguish between the two different impacts of classical endogeneity and 
differential measurement error. Furthermore, it did not control for classical 
measurement error. The difference between the research in this current chapter and the 
content of previous international research lies in the econometric methodology. For 
example, Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2002) model participation and health 
simultaneously, in order to capture the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. They also 
include an equation for reported health and include this into their likelihood function. 
Their overall result would be the same as ours but does not provide a breakdown of the 
contribution of each type of measurement error and classical endogeneity. The 
contribution and strength of this chapter is that it provides results that distinguish 
between the effects of each type of measurement error (classical and differential) and 
classical endogeneity.
5.2 Theoretical problems with estimation and proposed model
The empirical model is based on the comparisons of utility outlined in chapter one. 
Statistical problems associated with using a self-reported measure of disability or bad 
health in a participation model are well known, but often ignored in the estimation of 
the effect of disability on labour force participation. Bound (1991) documented these 
issues and some possible methods for correction, in detail. He noted that using an 
instrumental variables approach cannot completely eliminate the bias introduced by 
differential measurement error. If the purpose of a model is to accurately estimate the 
effect of disability and financial incentives on participation, instrumental variables will 
only correct for the bias in the disability measure but not the bias in financial variables. 
A further difficulty with the instrumental variables approach is the need for a good 
instrument of disability. Nonetheless, this method has been widely used in the literature 
(e.g. Stem 1989, Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999). Very often the instruments available are 
not satisfactory and/or good instrumental variables are not included in surveys.
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A general model of participation is represented by a latent variable equation;
y i,= b0 + bxD + b2z u + a : + s„il [5.1]
In this model, y\( is not observed and instead we observe y u = 1 if y*t > 0 or y u = 0 if 
y* < 0 , where y u is the observed indicator of labour force participation, y*u is the 
underlying construct generating y jt, and z jt represents a range of other variables. The 
individual time invariant unobserved effect is captured by a i . True disability is 
represented by D* but we do not know the value of this variable in practice, therefore 
we use an indicator of disability, D s . As outlined in the previous chapter, this variable 
is potentially measured with error. If individuals’ reported disability is influenced by 
economic incentives that draw them towards a particular labour force group then 
reported disability will be systematically biased, and differential measurement error 
may be introduced into the model. We explore this as follows;
Dj, = a{D*jt + a2y*it + , [5.2]
This indicator of disability, Ds then takes the place of D* in equation [5.1] so our full 
model is then;
Tv =  K  +  b\ Av +  ^22 u + a i +  s u [5 -3 ]
Replacing D* with Ds will lead to a bias in the estimate of disability in the participation 
model because differential measurement error is introduced by y*t . Classical 
measurement error will occur if D* and ¿fare uncorrelated. In summary, classical 
measurement error leads to an underestimate of the disability effect but differential 
measurement error tends to bias the estimate of disability upwards. Bound (1991) sets 
out exactly how both types of measurement error may occur. The overall effect of 
measurement error therefore may either increase or decrease the base estimate.
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As Bound (1991) noted, correcting for both classical and differential measurement error 
in a participation model is not straightforward. Using objective measures to proxy for 
true disability will underestimate the effects of disability if the proxy is not perfectly 
correlated with work related disability. Bound also explains in detail the reasons why 
the instrumental variables approach will obtain consistent estimates of disability but not 
other variables that may be correlated with disability. To identify the effect of disability 
and other correlated variables, a second objective measure could be used to instrument 
the first objective measure. The approach set out by Bound is problematic in two 
respects -firstly, good instruments are difficult to obtain and secondly, the estimation 
procedure is complicated.
Following a model proposed by Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995), in this thesis 
measurement error is addressed by creating a cleansed variable of disability. This 
removes both differential and classical measurement error. The cleansed variable is 
constructed following estimation of a correlated random effects generalised ordered 
probit model and the predicted probability of reporting a disability as if employed is 
calculated as;
Pr(D,; = j )  = Vv(cJwork < f { D l x xu) < c J+x work) [5.4]
In the above equation, D °  is an objective measure that may be viewed as an
instrumental variable for self-reported disability, and therefore controls for classical 
measurement error. The probabilities are calculated as if  employed (the cut-points of the 
employed in the correlated random effects generalised ordered probit model are applied) 
and this controls for differential measurement error. This model and estimation 
procedure is described in detail in Chapter four of this thesis. The final cleansed 
measure is an index of the probability of having a severely or to some extent limiting 
disability.
However, it is important to note that the cleansed measure may itself suffer from 
classical endogeneity. The measure of true disability could still be correlated with 
unobserved effects that influence labour force status. Our model outlined above does
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not control for this classical endogeneity. Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2002) deal with the 
problems of endogeneity and measurement error by jointly estimating the participation 
and objective health equations. In this chapter, we propose a new approach. We use the 
Mundlak estimator, similar to the Wooldridge approach adopted in Chapter three. The 
distribution of the unobserved effect is conditional on the time-averages of any 
potentially endogenous variables;
or,. = cr0 +  a ]z j + a t [5.5]
In summary, a model with cleansed disability removes classical and differential error, 
and unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for via the Mundlak estimator. In Chapter 
four, the Mundlak estimator for reported disability controlled for endogeneity (this 
could include differential error), but not classical measurement error.
For simplicity in this chapter we focus on a static model of labour force participation, 
first using the self-reported disability variable, and then replacing this with the new 
indicator that has been corrected for classical and differential measurement error. The 
difference in the disability estimate from the first two models represents the combined 
effect of classical and differential measurement error effect [model 1 v model 2]. The 
third model controls for the correlated individual effects using the cleansed measure 
[model 3]. This is our best estimate of the effect of disability on labour force 
participation. For comparison purposes we also estimate the Mundlak model with 
reported disability. The difference between this estimate and that obtained from the first 
model, gives an indication of the overall unobserved effects. In model 4, we get an 
estimate of the reported disability after controlling for unobservables. Comparison of 
model 4 with model 3 gives us the extent of classical measurement error, which can be 
used in conjunction with model 3 to gauge the importance of differential measurement 
error.
We can conclude that the true impact of disability is given by model 3. This is the net 
effect of disability, but we should also compare models 2 and 3 to get an estimate of the 
impact of unobservables associated with cleansed disability and participation.
109
5.3 Data
The data on disability and labour force participation in Ireland are again taken from the 
Living in Ireland Survey 1995-2001. To recap on the approach adopted in chapter four, 
we created a cleansed measure of disability based on predicted probabilities of having 
severe or some limitations in daily activities, if individuals reported as if they were 
employed. These are calculated from the correlated random effects generalised ordered 
probit model, and the mean of this new index of disability is 0.07, i.e. 7% of the sample 
has a severe or some limitation once we correct for measurement error. Our 
dichotomous variable of reported disability (i.e. severe or some limitations) has a mean 
of 0 .1 0 , indicating that 1 0 % of the sample report having severe or some limitations. 
This is our uncorrected measure of disability. As in the previous chapter, our sample 
relates to individuals under 65 only, and once we account for missing observations the 
final pooled sample is 33,126.
5.4 Results
We estimate pooled static models of participation and present results in Table 5.126. The 
first model shows baseline coefficient estimates using the dichotomous variable that 
equals 1 if an individual reported having a severe or some limitation. The second model 
describes results from a similar equation, but now replaces the disability variable with 
our new cleansed index of disability. In order to facilitate comparisons between 
estimates of this index and those provided by model 1 , we re-scale the coefficients from 
model 2. This is achieved by multiplying the coefficients obtained in model 2 by the 
average difference in the value of the cleansed disability index, between those reporting 
a disability (i.e. severe or some limitation) and those not reporting a disability (i.e. they 
report no limitation or no disability). The difference is 0.14. The third model then uses 
the cleansed disability index but also controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Again, the 
coefficients are re-scaled.
Model 1 indicates that disability significantly reduces the probability of participation, 
even when we control for age, gender, education and marital status. This is the effect of 
reported disability on labour force participation, but as noted earlier this estimate of -
26 In chapter three we demonstrated that a random effects probit model would be preferable i f  disability is 
strictly exogenous. We tested for strict exogeneity o f the old disability variable and the new index, and in 
both cases found this hypothesis was rejected. Therefore, we concentrate on pooled models.
1 1 0
0.7260 suffers from three potential biases, i.e. classical and/or differential measurement 
error and classical endogeneity. Model 2 estimates the impact of the new cleansed 
disability index (based on predictions as if employed) and the estimate of disability now 
has a lower effect on participation, now at -0.6158. This suggests that due to 
measurement error (the combined effect of classical and differential), the original 
estimate of self-reported disability was overestimated. At this stage, we do not know the 
type of measurement error that has biased the original impact of -0.7260. But the fact 
that the original estimate was higher suggests to us that measurement error is largely 
due to differential reporting behaviour as opposed to classical measurement error. In 
order to determine the magnitude of each type of measurement error, we will need to 
introduce unobservables into both of these models. This will allow us to distinguish 
between the unobserved heterogeneity and each type of measurement error. In the third 
model, unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for and this lowers the estimate of 
cleansed disability to -0.4726, indicating that unobserved individual effects are a large 
component of the original disability estimate (either reported or cleansed). It is possible 
though that much of this unobserved effect arises from previous non-participation due 
to earlier disabilities -  this is a strong result found in chapter three. This is our best 
estimate of the effect of disability on labour force participation.
For comparison with results in chapter four, model 4 controls for unobservables using 
the Mundlak approach but with reported disability. This is the static equivalent of the 
model used in chapter three. In the presence of endogeneity only, models 3 and 4 would 
yield similar results. More specifically, endogeneity accounts for approximately 50-60% 
of the baseline estimate in model 3. The fact that our estimate in model 4 is actually 
lower than that of model 3 reflects the downward bias associated with classical 
measurement error.
I l l
Table 5.1 Estimation Results - Pooled Probit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Reported Cleansed Index Cleansed Index Reported
Disability (rescaled) (rescaled) and Disability and
Unobservables Unobservables
Disability -0.7260** -0.6158** -0.4726** -0.2985**
Age 0.1728** 0.1754** 0.2277** 0 .2 2 2 1 **
Age squared -0 .0 0 2 2 ** -0 .0 0 2 2 ** -0 .0 0 2 2 ** -0 .0 0 2 2 **
Female -1.0802** -1.0579** -1.0630** -1.0936**
Secondary 0.3613** 0.2157** 0.0315 0.0239
Education
Third Level 0.9992** 0.8115** 0.4419** 0.4279**
Education
Married -0.2047** -0.2527** -0.0064 -0 . 0 2 0 0
Time averages
Age -0.0531** -0.0488**
Married -0.2574** -0.2025**
Secondary 0.1732** 0.3437**
Education
Third Level 0.3677** 0.5920**
Education
Disability -0.2524** -0.6952**
Constant -1.8714** -1.6912** -1.6637** -1.8633**
N 33126 33126 33126 33126
Pseudo R 0.2167 0.2361 0.2414 0.2249
squared
Note: * *p  < 0.05,*p  <0.10
The results so far highlight the importance of incorporating measurement error and 
classical endogeneity of disability into a labour force participation model. These results 
were presented as coefficients but marginal effects are useful if  we want to know the 
magnitude of the effect of disability on participation. In Chapter two, we estimated a 
participation model without these two factors and found that the marginal effect of 
disability was substantial, reducing the probability of participation by 27-30 percentage 
points, depending on severity of limitations. We now present marginal effects for 
models 1-4 in Table 5.2. Model 1 finds that reported disability (severe or some 
limitations) reduces the probability of participation by approximately 26 percentage
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points overall. The true effect of 15 percentage points is given by model 3, so the 
overall bias is 11 percentage points. By comparing model 3 and model 4, we get an 
estimate of 4 percentage points for classical measurement error. Model 2 provides a 
figure for cleansed disability that removes the bias from both classical and differential 
measurement error. By subtracting 0.04 from this, and comparing the result to model 1 
we infer that 10 percentage points is differential measurement error. Classical 
endogeneity is obtained by comparing models 2 and 3, and is estimated at 5 percentage 
points.
Table 5.2 Estimation Results - Pooled Probit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Disability Cleansed Index Cleansed Index Disability
(controlling for (controlling for
unobservables) unobservables)
Disability -0.26** -0 .2 0 ** -0.15** - 0 . 11* *
Note:**p  < 0.05,*p  <0.10
In terms of participation rates, we find that the true rate would be 55 per cent compared 
to 44 per cent if we use the reported disability variable.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter brings together the analyses from the earlier chapters on unobserved 
heterogeneity and measurement error. Using a cleansed measure of disability the labour 
force participation is re-estimated and results indicate that true impact of disability is to 
reduce participation by 15 percentage points. The bias introduced by the original 
estimate of 26 percentage points is a combination of an upward bias from classical 
endogeneity and differential measurement error and a downward bias introduced by 
classical measurement error. We find that approximately half of the original bias is due 
to unobserved effects and half due to a combination of classical and differential 
measurement error. Our results show that the original estimate of -26 percentage points 
was overestimated by 1 0  percentage points due to differential error and was 
underestimated by 4 percentage points due to classical measurement error. Classical 
endogeneity led to an overestimate of 5 percentage points.
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In general, research using data from other countries has found similar results in terms of 
unobserved effects -  these results are discussed in Chapter three. The only other paper 
to deal with both measurement error and unobserved effects was by Lindeboom and 
Kerfhofs (2002). The results from their model did not distinguish between the level of 
measurement error and unobservables. In that context, this chapter contributes 
significantly to the international debate on the endogeneity and measurement error in a 
labour force participation model. These results are of crucial importance to policy 
makers in the light of the recent legislation on equality and the campaign for civil rights 
for people with disabilities.
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
People with disabilities face many barriers to full participation in society, not least in 
the labour market. The extent and nature of participation in the labour market has a 
multitude of direct and indirect effects on the living standards and quality of life of 
people with disabilities, and is thus a critical area for investigation and policy concern. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a detailed description of the labour market situation 
of people with disabilities in Ireland, and an analysis of factors associated with 
participation. The main question addressed is, what is the impact of disability on labour 
force participation? These benchmark levels are of crucial relevance to disability and 
employment policy in Ireland. This thesis also contributes to international research by 
applying the latest econometric methodologies to analyse the relationship between 
disability and labour force participation.
This chapter concludes the thesis by describing the policy recommendations that are 
based on the findings of this research.
6.2 Policy Implications
In terms of formulating disability and employment policy, a key issue is to firstly survey 
the extent of non-participation by people with disabilities in the labour force, and to 
gauge how this differs by various individual circumstances. Chapter two provides 
baseline estimates that indicate the high level of non-participation (40 per cent of 
individuals with disabilities participate compared with 70 per cent of people without 
disabilities), which in itself is an important contribution to disability and employment 
policy. These estimates will form the benchmark for ongoing monitoring of the 
prevalence of participation levels for people with disabilities in Ireland. The description 
of disability and work transitions deepen our knowledge and understanding of the 
impact of disability on employment in a dynamic context. Furthermore, they quantify 
the impact of disability onset, exit and persistence of disability on employment 
probability, having taken other characteristics of the individual and their household into 
account. Results show that not only persistent disability but also disability onset are
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associated with a very substantial reduction in the likelihood that someone will be in 
employment. The diversity of people with disabilities is highlighted in this chapter, in 
particular the duration of disability. This poses a major challenge for policy in relation 
to tackling the many-faceted barriers to obtaining and maintaining employment for
97people with disabilities. If data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions is 
available for research, a comparative analysis with other European countries could 
contribute significantly to the study of the interaction between disability, participation 
and the social welfare systems of each country.
Policy implications from Chapter three focus on the channels by which current and 
previous disability influence current labour force participation. The results add to the 
evidence from previous research about the impact of persistent disability on the 
probability of being in work. We find that past participation is also an important factor 
in the labour force participation decision for disabled people, and the effect of past 
disability on past labour force participation is relevant in this context. The results 
highlight the difference in effects between longer term and short-term disability. The 
effect of past disability may have a continued effect through state dependence in labour 
force participation, even after recovery from the disability. Therefore, the focus of 
disability policy should be on early targeting of disabled individuals into employment.
The dis-incentive effects of disability benefits may also play a role here and these 
factors are investigated in chapter four. The results indicate that there is substantial mis- 
reporting among the disabled/ill group and this is most likely largely motivated by 
accessible financial incentives. Policy should therefore be targeted on more effective 
monitoring of disability benefits and medical examinations. This is the main conclusion 
brought out in the international comparisons of mis-reporting in chapter four. An 
effective strategy is required, bearing in mind the fact that such monitoring is resource 
intensive -  requiring targeted interventions at the individual level, as well as further 
integration of government departments.
Chapter five highlights the policy implications of knowing the extent of measurement 
error and the subsequent effect on participation figures. The results suggest that a more
27 This survey is a successor to the E C H P  data, and only recently available for academic use.
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accurate participation level for people with disabilities is in the region of 55 per cent, 
compared to level of about 40 per cent revealed in chapter two. The original impact of 
disability on participation is partly due to observed characteristics (approximately half), 
unobserved effects (approximately quarter) and classical and differential measurement 
error (approximately quarter). Nonetheless the difference to the participation rates of 
non-disabled at 70 per cent is still substantial and employment policies should be 
directed to integrating those who wish to work into the labour force. Solutions to 
increasing labour force participation for people with disabilities would therefore involve 
a combination of policies, including for example, more effective monitoring of 
disability recipients, training for those who wish to re-enter the labour force in a 
different job and disability friendly workplaces to encourage people with genuine 
disabilities to work.
6.3 Conclusion
The in-depth research that lies behind this thesis has been brought to the attention of the 
relevant policy makers in Ireland . One of the main conclusions from earlier research 
(presented in chapter two) highlighted the need for a large scale survey on disability in 
Ireland. After much discussion between all the relevant stakeholders, this survey is 
currently being conducted by the Central Statistics Office. In addition, the National 
Disability Authority hosted a roundtable discussion with many government agencies 
and stakeholders, in late 2005. The aim was to determine the best way forward for 
greater social inclusion for people with disabilities. Some of the figures from this thesis 
were quoted at this discussion, and provided the baseline data to inform the debate from 
which recommendations were collated and later presented to the National Anti-Poverty 
Strategy. It is a source of much personal satisfaction to see that my research applying 
the most recent developments in econometric methodology is being used by government 
departments and agencies to support their proposals and to influence social inclusion.
28 Presentations have been made to policy makers at the launch o f the report titled Disability and Social 
Inclusion, (June 2005), at the N D A  conferences 2004 and 2005, and policy analyses in chapter four will 
be presented at the Budget Perspectives Conference 2007 (October 2006).
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